

# THE SENATE UAP HEARING



**LIVE!**



1  
00:14:19,980 --> 00:14:29,630  
seriously

2  
00:14:44,389 --> 00:14:38,590  
[Music]

3  
00:15:00,190 --> 00:14:45,460  
foreign

4  
00:15:28,410 --> 00:15:26,569  
[Music]

5  
00:15:39,320 --> 00:15:28,420  
thank you

6  
00:16:08,300 --> 00:15:57,580  
[Music]

7  
00:16:38,170 --> 00:16:08,310  
foreign

8  
00:16:43,730 --> 00:16:41,449  
I'll be having a hearing on all of the

9  
00:16:45,769 --> 00:16:43,740  
unidentified aerial phenomenon this

10  
00:16:47,030 --> 00:16:45,779  
coming week oh great um and one of them

11  
00:16:49,370 --> 00:16:47,040  
you come back and talk to us about it

12  
00:16:51,710 --> 00:16:49,380  
afterwards absolutely okay um I created

13  
00:16:54,050 --> 00:16:51,720

along with uh Senator Warner and Senator

14

00:16:56,749 --> 00:16:54,060

Rubio and Senator Heinrich and some

15

00:16:58,670 --> 00:16:56,759

others an office within the dod and the

16

00:17:00,530 --> 00:16:58,680

intelligence committee specifically to

17

00:17:02,749 --> 00:17:00,540

review every unidentified aerial

18

00:17:06,110 --> 00:17:02,759

phenomenon that the military has access

19

00:17:09,970 --> 00:17:06,120

to and we have the most intense

20

00:17:13,370 --> 00:17:09,980

intensely specific technology that can

21

00:17:15,590 --> 00:17:13,380

video uh different aerial phenomenon

22

00:17:17,210 --> 00:17:15,600

that can get radar heat sensing through

23

00:17:19,429 --> 00:17:17,220

our aircraft through other radar

24

00:17:22,130 --> 00:17:19,439

detection and so we set up this office

25

00:17:25,630 --> 00:17:22,140

two years ago and during that two years

26

00:17:28,549 --> 00:17:25,640

they've reviewed over 300 different

27

00:17:30,409 --> 00:17:28,559

evidence of aerial phenomenon about half

28

00:17:32,570 --> 00:17:30,419

of them were deemed to be weather

29

00:17:35,529 --> 00:17:32,580

balloons these type of balloon

30

00:17:39,230 --> 00:17:35,539

technology perhaps detection devices

31

00:17:43,010 --> 00:17:39,240

about two dozen were deemed to be drones

32

00:17:45,289 --> 00:17:43,020

a handful were debris or birds and there

33

00:17:48,289 --> 00:17:45,299

was still 171 that they have not

34

00:17:50,330 --> 00:17:48,299

assessed what it is and so this work has

35

00:17:52,070 --> 00:17:50,340

to be done if we're going to have domain

36

00:17:54,350 --> 00:17:52,080

awareness if we're going to have aerial

37

00:17:56,270 --> 00:17:54,360

dominance if we want to make sure that

38

00:17:59,390 --> 00:17:56,280

our adversaries aren't spying on us or

39

00:18:01,250 --> 00:17:59,400

using new technologies or have aircraft

40

00:18:03,049 --> 00:18:01,260

that we don't even know how it functions

41

00:18:05,930 --> 00:18:03,059

or how fast it is or how effective it is

42

00:18:08,990 --> 00:18:05,940

that is a national security risk and so

43

00:18:11,210 --> 00:18:09,000

knowing what these aircraft are is

44

00:18:13,909 --> 00:18:11,220

essential and the military unfortunately

45

00:18:16,370 --> 00:18:13,919

just hasn't been doing that work they've

46

00:18:17,990 --> 00:18:16,380

just assumed they are non-adversarial

47

00:18:20,630 --> 00:18:18,000

because of how they fly or how they

48

00:18:23,570 --> 00:18:20,640

function but I think knowing whether you

49

00:18:25,669 --> 00:18:23,580

are being spied on through different

50

00:18:27,470 --> 00:18:25,679

kinds of technology is essential to our

51  
00:18:28,909 --> 00:18:27,480  
national security so this office is up

52  
00:18:30,470 --> 00:18:28,919  
and running I'm working with colleagues

53  
00:18:32,150 --> 00:18:30,480  
to make sure it's fully funded we're

54  
00:18:34,250 --> 00:18:32,160  
pushing the by Administration and the

55  
00:18:52,070 --> 00:18:34,260  
military to ask for full funding this

56  
00:18:56,330 --> 00:18:54,049  
let's just roll back a bit let's go back

57  
00:18:59,029 --> 00:18:56,340  
to February let's talk about what

58  
00:19:02,270 --> 00:18:59,039  
happened over Dead Horse Alaska in

59  
00:19:05,510 --> 00:19:02,280  
February yeah now we know that three

60  
00:19:07,490 --> 00:19:05,520  
objects were allegedly shot down we know

61  
00:19:10,190 --> 00:19:07,500  
that they were engaged with Sidewinder

62  
00:19:12,169 --> 00:19:10,200  
missiles by fighter jets from the U.S

63  
00:19:14,930 --> 00:19:12,179

Air Force

64

00:19:17,270 --> 00:19:14,940

now what's so interesting is what I'm

65

00:19:19,010 --> 00:19:17,280

hearing about dead horse

66

00:19:21,590 --> 00:19:19,020

and this is I think perhaps where

67

00:19:23,330 --> 00:19:21,600

questions could be pertinently directed

68

00:19:25,430 --> 00:19:23,340

because although

69

00:19:29,450 --> 00:19:25,440

the particular Senator that I'm thinking

70

00:19:31,310 --> 00:19:29,460

of is a member of the Senate armed

71

00:19:32,990 --> 00:19:31,320

services committee

72

00:19:35,390 --> 00:19:33,000

they're not a member of the emerging

73

00:19:37,730 --> 00:19:35,400

threats committee so let's just flagged

74

00:19:40,370 --> 00:19:37,740

to the emerging threats committee that

75

00:19:42,470 --> 00:19:40,380

we know that there is a senator on the

76  
00:19:45,470 --> 00:19:42,480  
Senate armed services committee who has

77  
00:19:46,370 --> 00:19:45,480  
been approached by a member of the Air

78  
00:19:50,150 --> 00:19:46,380  
Force

79  
00:19:52,909 --> 00:19:50,160  
asking the committee to ask more pointed

80  
00:19:55,669 --> 00:19:52,919  
questions about what happened over Dead

81  
00:19:57,830 --> 00:19:55,679  
Horse Alaska and I'm just going to read

82  
00:19:59,870 --> 00:19:57,840  
out a few questions that I think should

83  
00:20:01,850 --> 00:19:59,880  
be asked

84  
00:20:03,350 --> 00:20:01,860  
why have no Congressional

85  
00:20:05,270 --> 00:20:03,360  
Representatives being given the

86  
00:20:08,750 --> 00:20:05,280  
opportunity to cite the purported

87  
00:20:10,789 --> 00:20:08,760  
shootdown videos shot by fighter jets in

88  
00:20:13,130 --> 00:20:10,799

February during the multiple incursions

89

00:20:15,169 --> 00:20:13,140  
over U.S airspace

90

00:20:17,210 --> 00:20:15,179  
and as we understand its senators and

91

00:20:18,710 --> 00:20:17,220  
representatives have been refused the

92

00:20:23,810 --> 00:20:18,720  
opportunity to even view this Vision

93

00:20:26,810 --> 00:20:23,820  
even in a secure skiff why the secrecy

94

00:20:28,730 --> 00:20:26,820  
does the witness does Dr Kirkpatrick

95

00:20:31,010 --> 00:20:28,740  
have any knowledge about the specific

96

00:20:34,130 --> 00:20:31,020  
shoot down incident over or near Dead

97

00:20:36,890 --> 00:20:34,140  
Horse Alaska in February

98

00:20:38,990 --> 00:20:36,900  
what exactly did the pilot report seeing

99

00:20:40,250 --> 00:20:39,000  
when he engaged the object with a

100

00:20:43,430 --> 00:20:40,260  
missile

101  
00:20:45,710 --> 00:20:43,440  
was the object seen to actually crash or

102  
00:20:47,630 --> 00:20:45,720  
descend as a result of that missile

103  
00:20:49,970 --> 00:20:47,640  
being fired

104  
00:20:52,610 --> 00:20:49,980  
why is vision of that particular instant

105  
00:20:55,850 --> 00:20:52,620  
still being kept classified as well as

106  
00:20:57,710 --> 00:20:55,860  
the pilots after Action Report even to

107  
00:20:59,930 --> 00:20:57,720  
confidential hearings of the relevant

108  
00:21:02,450 --> 00:20:59,940  
congressional committees

109  
00:21:05,930 --> 00:21:02,460  
is the witness prepared to deny the

110  
00:21:08,450 --> 00:21:05,940  
reports that I'm hearing that the object

111  
00:21:10,370 --> 00:21:08,460  
when hit by the explosion of the Jets

112  
00:21:14,210 --> 00:21:10,380  
Sidewinder missile

113  
00:21:16,490 --> 00:21:14,220

actually stayed in the air despite that

114

00:21:19,549 --> 00:21:16,500

direct explosion

115

00:21:22,490 --> 00:21:19,559

something was seen by the pilot to fall

116

00:21:25,130 --> 00:21:22,500

from the object that he engaged but I'm

117

00:21:28,610 --> 00:21:25,140

told the main object was not in fact

118

00:21:30,950 --> 00:21:28,620

shot done by the missile

119

00:21:34,909 --> 00:21:30,960

does the witness does Dr Sean

120

00:21:37,850 --> 00:21:34,919

Kirkpatrick deny categorically that this

121

00:21:39,350 --> 00:21:37,860

is the case if Dr Kirkpatrick is to say

122

00:21:40,730 --> 00:21:39,360

to the committee that he doesn't know

123

00:21:42,830 --> 00:21:40,740

about this incident that he hasn't

124

00:21:44,390 --> 00:21:42,840

briefed himself about this incident and

125

00:21:45,710 --> 00:21:44,400

he should be sacked immediately the

126

00:21:46,789 --> 00:21:45,720

committee should be asking for his

127

00:21:48,710 --> 00:21:46,799

resignation

128

00:21:51,230 --> 00:21:48,720

if he doesn't come into the Committee

129

00:21:54,230 --> 00:21:51,240

hearing properly briefed about the the

130

00:21:55,310 --> 00:21:54,240

three shoot down incidents over U.S in

131

00:22:09,890 --> 00:21:55,320

February

132

00:22:14,630 --> 00:22:12,649

like do you feel sort of wouldn't say

133

00:22:16,130 --> 00:22:14,640

Vindicated but it must feel good to be

134

00:22:18,649 --> 00:22:16,140

at this point where people are like well

135

00:22:21,830 --> 00:22:18,659

maybe Kevin was on to something before

136

00:22:26,930 --> 00:22:25,430

boy howdy boy do I feel Vindicated yeah

137

00:22:28,909 --> 00:22:26,940

as a matter of fact I got to tell you

138

00:22:31,610 --> 00:22:28,919

guys something there's a pretty good

139

00:22:32,870 --> 00:22:31,620

pretty good chance that I at some point

140

00:22:34,669 --> 00:22:32,880

in the future I'll be going back to

141

00:22:36,830 --> 00:22:34,679

Congress to tell my story and stuff and

142

00:22:39,470 --> 00:22:36,840

answer questions and all that but I have

143

00:22:41,510 --> 00:22:39,480

to say right now I'm in no way shippers

144

00:22:44,330 --> 00:22:41,520

form looking for compensation in any way

145

00:22:45,890 --> 00:22:44,340

right that's not what I I want the

146

00:22:48,590 --> 00:22:45,900

opposite in fact

147

00:22:50,570 --> 00:22:48,600

in fact if I get to Congress um if they

148

00:22:51,770 --> 00:22:50,580

give me the opportunity of course I'm

149

00:22:53,690 --> 00:22:51,780

going to answer all the questions tell

150

00:22:54,710 --> 00:22:53,700

the story like I just did right all that

151  
00:22:55,909 --> 00:22:54,720  
stuff

152  
00:22:57,830 --> 00:22:55,919  
but I'm going to give them two

153  
00:23:00,350 --> 00:22:57,840  
recommendations

154  
00:23:01,730 --> 00:23:00,360  
number one and you gotta remember I went

155  
00:23:04,010 --> 00:23:01,740  
through this experience and I have a

156  
00:23:05,510 --> 00:23:04,020  
master's degree in education

157  
00:23:07,010 --> 00:23:05,520  
I'm going to say

158  
00:23:09,590 --> 00:23:07,020  
um

159  
00:23:11,090 --> 00:23:09,600  
the need for public education about UAP

160  
00:23:13,549 --> 00:23:11,100  
is obvious

161  
00:23:16,370 --> 00:23:13,559  
let's start teaching about these things

162  
00:23:17,510 --> 00:23:16,380  
from grade school to high school and

163  
00:23:20,450 --> 00:23:17,520

Beyond

164

00:23:22,549 --> 00:23:20,460

at all appropriate grade levels that way

165

00:23:24,710 --> 00:23:22,559

guess what happens when Mommy picks up

166

00:23:26,149 --> 00:23:24,720

Sally and Joey from school and they're

167

00:23:28,070 --> 00:23:26,159

driving home and all of a sudden Sally

168

00:23:30,049 --> 00:23:28,080

says hey look Joey it's one of those

169

00:23:32,750 --> 00:23:30,059

things we learned about in school

170

00:23:35,210 --> 00:23:32,760

is it any big deal now

171

00:23:36,950 --> 00:23:35,220

you tell me yeah what about when they

172

00:23:40,070 --> 00:23:36,960

get home and tell Dad and others is it

173

00:23:41,270 --> 00:23:40,080

any big deal now yeah same question I

174

00:23:43,789 --> 00:23:41,280

don't think so

175

00:23:45,409 --> 00:23:43,799

and and you were kind of touching on it

176  
00:23:46,430 --> 00:23:45,419  
and my other recommendation is going to

177  
00:23:50,750 --> 00:23:46,440  
be this

178  
00:23:55,130 --> 00:23:53,570  
forgive

179  
00:23:56,750 --> 00:23:55,140  
move on

180  
00:23:58,970 --> 00:23:56,760  
and move up

181  
00:24:01,190 --> 00:23:58,980  
because this is nobody's fault and

182  
00:24:02,750 --> 00:24:01,200  
people that like to point blame it my

183  
00:24:04,909 --> 00:24:02,760  
government and people that work in my

184  
00:24:05,990 --> 00:24:04,919  
government and somehow try to say

185  
00:24:08,390 --> 00:24:06,000  
they're bad

186  
00:24:11,810 --> 00:24:08,400  
that pisses me off

187  
00:24:13,190 --> 00:24:11,820  
I don't believe anything such malarkey

188  
00:24:14,990 --> 00:24:13,200

no way

189

00:24:16,730 --> 00:24:15,000

people that work in government are good

190

00:24:19,130 --> 00:24:16,740

people I mean there of course there's

191

00:24:20,390 --> 00:24:19,140

exceptions but they go to work like you

192

00:24:50,990 --> 00:24:20,400

do

193

00:24:52,789 --> 00:24:51,000

from Unknown Origin that they've been

194

00:24:54,529 --> 00:24:52,799

trying and are trying to reverse

195

00:24:56,390 --> 00:24:54,539

engineer and exploit those Technologies

196

00:24:59,450 --> 00:24:56,400

understand the physics and understand

197

00:25:00,470 --> 00:24:59,460

that technology do we have that to work

198

00:25:02,750 --> 00:25:00,480

with

199

00:25:05,270 --> 00:25:02,760

I can't talk about that but the answer

200

00:25:10,730 --> 00:25:07,430

so this is from weaponized uh Jeremy

201  
00:25:14,210 --> 00:25:10,740  
Corbell and George Knapp's podcast

202  
00:25:16,669 --> 00:25:14,220  
just that answer alone yeah I mean

203  
00:25:20,029 --> 00:25:16,679  
and I the type of whistleblower

204  
00:25:22,010 --> 00:25:20,039  
protections that are available like I

205  
00:25:23,870 --> 00:25:22,020  
hope we can expand that so it's not just

206  
00:25:26,330 --> 00:25:23,880  
for UFO related stuff but also for

207  
00:25:28,010 --> 00:25:26,340  
surveillance yeah to protect the

208  
00:25:30,529 --> 00:25:28,020  
snowden's and assangeas of the world

209  
00:25:33,169 --> 00:25:30,539  
like we need we need that and that's why

210  
00:25:34,909 --> 00:25:33,179  
I think that this uh office is going to

211  
00:25:37,370 --> 00:25:34,919  
be successful it's because like you

212  
00:25:40,610 --> 00:25:37,380  
can't the people who are doing the the

213  
00:25:42,830 --> 00:25:40,620

black projects need to have reassurance

214

00:25:44,690 --> 00:25:42,840

that they're not going to be screwed

215

00:25:47,810 --> 00:25:44,700

after coming forward

216

00:25:49,850 --> 00:25:47,820

and so you know this this type of

217

00:25:52,789 --> 00:25:49,860

legislation is is so key

218

00:25:55,070 --> 00:25:52,799

um I had an exchange with with melon

219

00:25:57,529 --> 00:25:55,080

recently and he actually told me to uh

220

00:26:01,190 --> 00:25:57,539

to mention this so he was saying that

221

00:26:02,690 --> 00:26:01,200

Lazar should come forward through Arrow

222

00:26:04,370 --> 00:26:02,700

because why not I mean if he was

223

00:26:07,490 --> 00:26:04,380

involved then

224

00:26:10,190 --> 00:26:07,500

he could participate in that

225

00:26:11,750 --> 00:26:10,200

organization and and put it through

226  
00:26:13,070 --> 00:26:11,760  
because that's the channel that we have

227  
00:26:15,230 --> 00:26:13,080  
now

228  
00:26:19,430 --> 00:26:15,240  
the idea that someone is going to come

229  
00:26:21,289 --> 00:26:19,440  
out and say we have downed UFOs but we

230  
00:26:23,630 --> 00:26:21,299  
can't talk about it

231  
00:26:26,630 --> 00:26:23,640  
like what does that mean do you have

232  
00:26:28,909 --> 00:26:26,640  
something that was unidentified that is

233  
00:26:31,850 --> 00:26:28,919  
from some other state some other

234  
00:26:33,649 --> 00:26:31,860  
government that you found and it's a

235  
00:26:35,149 --> 00:26:33,659  
it's unidentified

236  
00:26:37,610 --> 00:26:35,159  
or are you saying you have something

237  
00:26:39,169 --> 00:26:37,620  
from another planet there's two there's

238  
00:26:41,690 --> 00:26:39,179

two very different answers right because

239

00:26:44,210 --> 00:26:41,700

the the Chinese balloons included in

240

00:26:46,370 --> 00:26:44,220

this as well so if that gets downed you

241

00:26:49,250 --> 00:26:46,380

know that's that constitutes crash

242

00:26:51,230 --> 00:26:49,260

materials right like what is a uh it's

243

00:26:53,810 --> 00:26:51,240

unidentified what does that mean but are

244

00:26:55,430 --> 00:26:53,820

you saying that you have something that

245

00:26:57,049 --> 00:26:55,440

you re you're back engineering from

246

00:26:59,450 --> 00:26:57,059

another country or are you saying you

247

00:27:02,510 --> 00:26:59,460

have something that is of

248

00:27:29,510 --> 00:27:02,520

some completely Unknown Origin like

249

00:27:34,970 --> 00:27:31,490

I think the second part of your question

250

00:27:38,750 --> 00:27:34,980

uh was related to UAP or unidentified

251  
00:27:40,130 --> 00:27:38,760  
aerial uh phenomenon and that UAP task

252  
00:27:42,890 --> 00:27:40,140  
force

253  
00:27:46,190 --> 00:27:42,900  
um and and as far as I'm concerned or

254  
00:27:48,250 --> 00:27:46,200  
I'm knowledgeable above about that I do

255  
00:27:50,450 --> 00:27:48,260  
believe it does involve collaborative

256  
00:27:53,450 --> 00:27:50,460  
inputs and

257  
00:27:55,730 --> 00:27:53,460  
um information exchange with all kinds

258  
00:27:59,090 --> 00:27:55,740  
of countries around the globe because I

259  
00:28:01,149 --> 00:27:59,100  
think these are not just uh solely

260  
00:28:04,909 --> 00:28:01,159  
um

261  
00:28:07,130 --> 00:28:04,919  
actions or or or uh events that have

262  
00:28:08,870 --> 00:28:07,140  
occurred within the con confines in the

263  
00:28:10,370 --> 00:28:08,880

United States they've they've occurred

264

00:28:12,350 --> 00:28:10,380

globally and I think we're collecting

265

00:28:14,630 --> 00:28:12,360

that information uh we're sharing

266

00:28:17,090 --> 00:28:14,640

information we view that as an open and

267

00:28:19,010 --> 00:28:17,100

transparent effort and activity through

268

00:28:22,549 --> 00:28:19,020

uh through the United States Congress

269

00:28:25,850 --> 00:28:22,559

and and executed by our UAP task force

270

00:28:28,190 --> 00:28:25,860

office and so I I I would encourage

271

00:28:30,830 --> 00:28:28,200

greater uh collaboration and cooperation

272

00:28:33,110 --> 00:28:30,840

in that and particularly I think as we

273

00:28:37,070 --> 00:28:33,120

see uh various technologies that will

274

00:28:39,169 --> 00:28:37,080

help uh demystify or debunk or clarify

275

00:28:41,450 --> 00:28:39,179

um but but I think it's also important

276

00:28:44,029 --> 00:28:41,460

one of the one of the reasons that we

277

00:28:46,669 --> 00:28:44,039

are doing uh this effort is because

278

00:28:49,070 --> 00:28:46,679

National Security concerns are of

279

00:28:50,690 --> 00:28:49,080

Paramount importance and so is safety of

280

00:28:53,930 --> 00:28:50,700

flight and deconfliction and collision

281

00:28:56,930 --> 00:28:53,940

avoidance and and issues to preserve and

282

00:28:58,490 --> 00:28:56,940

protect human life so when we can uh we

283

00:29:00,710 --> 00:28:58,500

when we can better share and exchange

284

00:29:03,049 --> 00:29:00,720

information I think that's better much

285

00:29:05,149 --> 00:29:03,059

like we do in the international civil

286

00:29:08,269 --> 00:29:05,159

aviation organization or otherwise known

287

00:29:10,850 --> 00:29:08,279

as Iko uh or in any other International

288

00:29:13,130 --> 00:29:10,860

bodies as well I think there's a fertile

289

00:31:25,730 --> 00:29:13,140

an important opportunity to be pursued

290

00:31:25,740 --> 00:31:29,800

foreign

291

00:31:34,490 --> 00:31:31,510

[Music]

292

00:31:36,769 --> 00:31:34,500

podcast is free to listen to every week

293

00:31:39,710 --> 00:31:36,779

but if you would like to help support

294

00:31:41,870 --> 00:31:39,720

the show we have a very active patreon

295

00:31:44,510 --> 00:31:41,880

page where you give what you think the

296

00:31:47,149 --> 00:31:44,520

show is worth in return you'll get early

297

00:31:50,690 --> 00:31:47,159

access to the main show bonus episodes

298

00:31:53,630 --> 00:31:50,700

and priority to ask our guests your

299

00:31:56,750 --> 00:31:53,640

listener questions your support truly

300

00:32:00,490 --> 00:31:56,760

makes the show continue and grow so to

301  
00:32:02,120 --> 00:32:00,500  
learn more and to join visit [patreon.com](https://patreon.com)

302  
00:32:06,649 --> 00:32:02,130  
somewhere Skies

303  
00:33:40,909 --> 00:32:06,659  
[Music]

304  
00:33:46,549 --> 00:33:44,090  
well I'll be having a hearing on all of

305  
00:33:48,590 --> 00:33:46,559  
the unidentified aerial phenomenon this

306  
00:33:49,850 --> 00:33:48,600  
coming week oh great um and one of them

307  
00:33:51,350 --> 00:33:49,860  
you come back and talk to us about it

308  
00:33:53,630 --> 00:33:51,360  
afterwards absolutely okay

309  
00:33:55,970 --> 00:33:53,640  
um I created along with uh Senator

310  
00:33:57,889 --> 00:33:55,980  
Warner and Senator Rubio and Senator

311  
00:33:59,990 --> 00:33:57,899  
Heinrich and some others an office

312  
00:34:02,210 --> 00:34:00,000  
within the dod and the intelligence

313  
00:34:04,669 --> 00:34:02,220

committee specifically to review every

314

00:34:07,549 --> 00:34:04,679

unidentified aerial phenomenon that the

315

00:34:10,430 --> 00:34:07,559

military has access to and we have the

316

00:34:15,109 --> 00:34:10,440

most intense intensely specific

317

00:34:17,389 --> 00:34:15,119

technology that can video uh different

318

00:34:18,950 --> 00:34:17,399

aerial phenomenon that can get radar

319

00:34:21,649 --> 00:34:18,960

heat sensing through our aircraft

320

00:34:23,930 --> 00:34:21,659

through other radar detection and so we

321

00:34:25,970 --> 00:34:23,940

set up this office two years ago and

322

00:34:28,450 --> 00:34:25,980

during that two years they've reviewed

323

00:34:31,369 --> 00:34:28,460

over 300 different

324

00:34:33,230 --> 00:34:31,379

evidence of aerial phenomenon about half

325

00:34:35,389 --> 00:34:33,240

of them were deemed to be weather

326

00:34:38,349 --> 00:34:35,399

balloons these type of balloon

327

00:34:42,109 --> 00:34:38,359

technology perhaps detection devices

328

00:34:45,889 --> 00:34:42,119

about two dozen were deemed to be drones

329

00:34:48,109 --> 00:34:45,899

a handful were debris or birds and there

330

00:34:51,109 --> 00:34:48,119

was still 171 that they have not

331

00:34:53,149 --> 00:34:51,119

assessed what it is and so this work has

332

00:34:54,889 --> 00:34:53,159

to be done if we're going to have domain

333

00:34:57,170 --> 00:34:54,899

awareness if we're going to have aerial

334

00:34:59,150 --> 00:34:57,180

dominance if we want to make sure that

335

00:35:02,210 --> 00:34:59,160

our adversaries aren't spying on us or

336

00:35:04,070 --> 00:35:02,220

using new technologies or have aircraft

337

00:35:05,870 --> 00:35:04,080

that we don't even know how it functions

338

00:35:08,750 --> 00:35:05,880

or how fast it is or how effective it is

339

00:35:11,870 --> 00:35:08,760

that is a national security risk and so

340

00:35:14,030 --> 00:35:11,880

knowing what these aircraft are is

341

00:35:15,730 --> 00:35:14,040

essential and the military unfortunately

342

00:35:18,250 --> 00:35:15,740

it just hasn't been doing that work

343

00:35:20,270 --> 00:35:18,260

they've just assumed they are

344

00:35:23,030 --> 00:35:20,280

non-adversarial because of how they fly

345

00:35:25,329 --> 00:35:23,040

or how they function but I think knowing

346

00:35:27,890 --> 00:35:25,339

whether you are being spied on through

347

00:35:29,329 --> 00:35:27,900

different kinds of technology is

348

00:35:31,010 --> 00:35:29,339

essential to our national security so

349

00:35:32,089 --> 00:35:31,020

this office is up and running I'm

350

00:35:33,710 --> 00:35:32,099

working with colleagues to make sure

351

00:35:35,150 --> 00:35:33,720

it's fully funded we're pushing the

352

00:35:37,609 --> 00:35:35,160

buying Administration and the military

353

00:37:47,390 --> 00:35:37,619

to ask for full funding this this year

354

00:37:51,829 --> 00:37:50,030

does our government have downed UFOs

355

00:37:53,569 --> 00:37:51,839

from Unknown Origin that they've been

356

00:37:55,370 --> 00:37:53,579

trying and are trying to reverse

357

00:37:57,170 --> 00:37:55,380

engineer and exploit those Technologies

358

00:38:00,230 --> 00:37:57,180

understand the physics and understand

359

00:38:01,250 --> 00:38:00,240

that technology do we have that to work

360

00:38:03,589 --> 00:38:01,260

with

361

00:38:04,750 --> 00:38:03,599

I can't talk about that but the answer

362

00:38:07,250 --> 00:38:04,760

is yes

363

00:38:09,170 --> 00:38:07,260

let me let me put let me ask it this way

364

00:38:11,150 --> 00:38:09,180

so there are a number of whistleblowers

365

00:38:13,430 --> 00:38:11,160

who are who have new protections they're

366

00:38:15,410 --> 00:38:13,440

lining up we've heard we know some of

367

00:38:17,270 --> 00:38:15,420

them and that we know generally what

368

00:38:19,750 --> 00:38:17,280

they're prepared to say let's say they

369

00:38:22,609 --> 00:38:19,760

tell this to Congress and Congress

370

00:38:25,190 --> 00:38:22,619

authorizes Arrow hey the stuff is over

371

00:38:28,010 --> 00:38:25,200

here go get it how does that change the

372

00:38:30,170 --> 00:38:28,020

world if we suddenly acknowledge or at

373

00:38:32,050 --> 00:38:30,180

least the government finds and locates

374

00:38:34,910 --> 00:38:32,060

and tests

375

00:38:36,770 --> 00:38:34,920

somewhat in the open these meta

376

00:38:39,589 --> 00:38:36,780

materials created by someone else

377

00:38:41,270 --> 00:38:39,599

they're not ours or entire craft that

378

00:38:43,490 --> 00:38:41,280

were built by someone else and we can't

379

00:38:45,589 --> 00:38:43,500

figure out how it how they fly how does

380

00:38:47,870 --> 00:38:45,599

that change the dynamic of this and does

381

00:38:50,390 --> 00:38:47,880

that does that answer actually answer

382

00:38:52,250 --> 00:38:50,400

the big questions who they who built

383

00:38:55,609 --> 00:38:52,260

them where they're from why they're here

384

00:38:57,829 --> 00:38:55,619

well it certainly answers

385

00:39:00,650 --> 00:38:57,839

um the sort of sneaking suspicion that

386

00:39:02,569 --> 00:39:00,660

people have had over many many many

387

00:39:04,910 --> 00:39:02,579

decades that the United States

388

00:39:07,609 --> 00:39:04,920

government is not coming out with the

389

00:39:11,030 --> 00:39:07,619

full truth of what has happened behind

390

00:39:12,470 --> 00:39:11,040

closed doors in terms of the the

391

00:39:13,910 --> 00:39:12,480

questions that you're asking about

392

00:39:14,569 --> 00:39:13,920

though

393

00:39:17,569 --> 00:39:14,579

um

394

00:39:20,390 --> 00:39:17,579

technical performance and performance

395

00:39:23,089 --> 00:39:20,400

characteristics are fundamental if if

396

00:39:26,390 --> 00:39:23,099

the analysis the level of analysis that

397

00:39:28,790 --> 00:39:26,400

has happened on these objects is

398

00:39:31,490 --> 00:39:28,800

sufficient to generate you know as I

399

00:39:33,950 --> 00:39:31,500

said physics and Engineering

400

00:39:36,349 --> 00:39:33,960

um that is a major breakthrough and that

401  
00:39:40,609 --> 00:39:36,359  
would be a fundamental departure point

402  
00:39:42,710 --> 00:39:40,619  
for Humanity because Humanity would be

403  
00:42:37,250 --> 00:39:42,720  
able to answer that question are we

404  
00:42:40,910 --> 00:42:39,349  
the hearing will come to order I'd first

405  
00:42:43,310 --> 00:42:40,920  
like to thank our witness Dr Sean

406  
00:42:44,930 --> 00:42:43,320  
Kirkpatrick for testifying here and in

407  
00:42:46,490 --> 00:42:44,940  
today's earlier closed session and for

408  
00:42:48,530 --> 00:42:46,500  
as long long and distinguished career

409  
00:42:50,150 --> 00:42:48,540  
both in the intelligence community and

410  
00:42:52,370 --> 00:42:50,160  
in the Department of Defense Dr

411  
00:42:54,650 --> 00:42:52,380  
Kirkpatrick is the director of the all

412  
00:42:56,930 --> 00:42:54,660  
domain anomaly resolution office or

413  
00:42:59,089 --> 00:42:56,940

Arrow Congress established this office

414

00:43:00,530 --> 00:42:59,099

in law to get to the bottom of a very

415

00:43:03,410 --> 00:43:00,540

serious problem of unidentified

416

00:43:05,390 --> 00:43:03,420

anomalous phenomenon or UAP Dr

417

00:43:07,609 --> 00:43:05,400

Kirkpatrick has a very difficult Mission

418

00:43:09,170 --> 00:43:07,619

while we have made progress there

419

00:43:11,329 --> 00:43:09,180

remains a stigma attached to these

420

00:43:13,910 --> 00:43:11,339

phenomenon there is a vast and complex

421

00:43:15,710 --> 00:43:13,920

citizen engagement and there's also very

422

00:43:17,930 --> 00:43:15,720

challenging scientific and Technical

423

00:43:20,510 --> 00:43:17,940

hurdles so we appreciate the willingness

424

00:43:22,190 --> 00:43:20,520

of Dr Kirkpatrick to lean in on this

425

00:43:24,050 --> 00:43:22,200

issue and the work that he has

426

00:43:25,910 --> 00:43:24,060

accomplished thus far and we look

427

00:43:28,130 --> 00:43:25,920

forward to both his opening statement

428

00:43:31,430 --> 00:43:28,140

and his presentation of examples of the

429

00:43:33,410 --> 00:43:31,440

work Arrow has done in late 2017 media

430

00:43:35,270 --> 00:43:33,420

reports surfaced about activity set in

431

00:43:37,550 --> 00:43:35,280

motion by the late long-serving Majority

432

00:43:39,470 --> 00:43:37,560

Leader Senator Harry Reid more than a

433

00:43:40,970 --> 00:43:39,480

decade ago we learned that there was

434

00:43:42,410 --> 00:43:40,980

strong evidence advanced technology

435

00:43:43,849 --> 00:43:42,420

reflected in the features and

436

00:43:46,670 --> 00:43:43,859

performance characteristics of many

437

00:43:48,650 --> 00:43:46,680

objects observed by our highly trained

438

00:43:50,630 --> 00:43:48,660

service members operating top of the

439

00:43:52,910 --> 00:43:50,640

line military equipment

440

00:43:54,770 --> 00:43:52,920

we learned that for the at least the

441

00:43:56,630 --> 00:43:54,780

past eight years military Pilots

442

00:43:58,790 --> 00:43:56,640

frequently encountered unknown objects

443

00:44:00,650 --> 00:43:58,800

in controlled airspace off both the east

444

00:44:02,870 --> 00:44:00,660

and west coast across the continental

445

00:44:05,690 --> 00:44:02,880

United States in test and training areas

446

00:44:07,609 --> 00:44:05,700

and ranges we don't know where they are

447

00:44:09,710 --> 00:44:07,619

they come from who made them or how they

448

00:44:12,109 --> 00:44:09,720

operate as former deputy secretary of

449

00:44:13,609 --> 00:44:12,119

defense David norquist observed had any

450

00:44:15,710 --> 00:44:13,619

of these objects had the label made in

451  
00:44:17,450 --> 00:44:15,720  
China there would be an uproar in the

452  
00:44:19,370 --> 00:44:17,460  
government and media there would be no

453  
00:44:21,349 --> 00:44:19,380  
stone unturned and no efforts spared to

454  
00:44:22,790 --> 00:44:21,359  
find out what we were dealing with we

455  
00:44:24,950 --> 00:44:22,800  
can look at the recent incursion of the

456  
00:44:26,510 --> 00:44:24,960  
unidentified PRC high altitude balloon

457  
00:44:28,550 --> 00:44:26,520  
for as an example

458  
00:44:30,309 --> 00:44:28,560  
because and but because of the UFO

459  
00:44:33,230 --> 00:44:30,319  
stigma the response has been

460  
00:44:35,270 --> 00:44:33,240  
irresponsibly anemic and slow Congress

461  
00:44:37,550 --> 00:44:35,280  
established Arrow we made it clear that

462  
00:44:39,170 --> 00:44:37,560  
we expect vigorous action we added very

463  
00:44:41,630 --> 00:44:39,180

substantial initial funding for the

464

00:44:43,550 --> 00:44:41,640

office but despite our best efforts the

465

00:44:45,829 --> 00:44:43,560

president's budget for fisca is 23 and

466

00:44:47,750 --> 00:44:45,839

24 requested only enough funding to

467

00:44:49,970 --> 00:44:47,760

defray the operating expenses of Arrow

468

00:44:51,290 --> 00:44:49,980

it included almost no funds to sustain

469

00:44:52,670 --> 00:44:51,300

the critical research and development

470

00:44:54,530 --> 00:44:52,680

necessary to support a serious

471

00:44:56,390 --> 00:44:54,540

investigation it took a letter to

472

00:44:58,490 --> 00:44:56,400

secretary Austin from Senator Rubio and

473

00:45:00,230 --> 00:44:58,500

me and 14 other Senators to get the

474

00:45:02,450 --> 00:45:00,240

office temporary relief for the current

475

00:45:05,150 --> 00:45:02,460

fiscal year in this hearing I tend to

476  
00:45:06,770 --> 00:45:05,160  
probe a series of specific issues in the

477  
00:45:08,690 --> 00:45:06,780  
recent incidents where multiple objects

478  
00:45:10,250 --> 00:45:08,700  
were shot down over North America it

479  
00:45:12,589 --> 00:45:10,260  
seemed that Pentagon leadership did not

480  
00:45:14,510 --> 00:45:12,599  
turn to Aero office to play a leading

481  
00:45:15,950 --> 00:45:14,520  
role in advising the combatant commander

482  
00:45:17,390 --> 00:45:15,960  
we need to know whether this will

483  
00:45:19,370 --> 00:45:17,400  
continue we need to know whether the

484  
00:45:20,930 --> 00:45:19,380  
leadership and DOD will bring Arrow into

485  
00:45:23,030 --> 00:45:20,940  
the decision-making process in a visible

486  
00:45:24,710 --> 00:45:23,040  
way and we need to know what role Arrow

487  
00:45:27,470 --> 00:45:24,720  
will play in interagency coordination

488  
00:45:29,750 --> 00:45:27,480

after the NSC working group just fans

489

00:45:31,430 --> 00:45:29,760

in the fiscal year 2023 National Defense

490

00:45:33,650 --> 00:45:31,440

and intelligence authorization acts

491

00:45:35,390 --> 00:45:33,660

Congress established a direct reporting

492

00:45:37,550 --> 00:45:35,400

chain from the arrow director to the

493

00:45:38,990 --> 00:45:37,560

deputy secretary of defense the role of

494

00:45:40,790 --> 00:45:39,000

the office of the under secretary of

495

00:45:42,589 --> 00:45:40,800

defense for intelligence and security is

496

00:45:44,630 --> 00:45:42,599

limited to providing administrative

497

00:45:47,450 --> 00:45:44,640

support we need to know how this

498

00:45:49,370 --> 00:45:47,460

direction is being implemented UAP are

499

00:45:51,410 --> 00:45:49,380

frequently observed flying in extremely

500

00:45:53,089 --> 00:45:51,420

high or very low speeds and come in

501  
00:45:55,390 --> 00:45:53,099  
various sizes and shapes during the

502  
00:45:58,250 --> 00:45:55,400  
recent shutdowns over North America DOD

503  
00:45:59,990 --> 00:45:58,260  
disclosed that filters on radar systems

504  
00:46:01,670 --> 00:46:00,000  
were adjusted to allow for detection and

505  
00:46:03,589 --> 00:46:01,680  
tracking of diverse sets of objects for

506  
00:46:05,390 --> 00:46:03,599  
the first time while opening the

507  
00:46:07,849 --> 00:46:05,400  
aperture can overload the real-time

508  
00:46:09,589 --> 00:46:07,859  
analytic process we cannot keep turning

509  
00:46:12,109 --> 00:46:09,599  
a blind eye to surveillance data that is

510  
00:46:13,609 --> 00:46:12,119  
critical to detecting attracting UAP we

511  
00:46:15,109 --> 00:46:13,619  
need to know whether Dr Kirkpatrick

512  
00:46:17,510 --> 00:46:15,119  
could achieve the necessary control over

513  
00:46:19,490 --> 00:46:17,520

sensor filters and the storage and

514

00:46:22,069 --> 00:46:19,500

access to Raw surveillance data to find

515

00:46:24,170 --> 00:46:22,079

UAP anomalies finally one of the tasks

516

00:46:26,690 --> 00:46:24,180

Congress set for Arrow is serving as an

517

00:46:28,309 --> 00:46:26,700

open door for Witnesses of UAP events or

518

00:46:30,950 --> 00:46:28,319

participants in government activities

519

00:46:32,930 --> 00:46:30,960

related to uaps to come forward securely

520

00:46:34,910 --> 00:46:32,940

and disclose what they know without fear

521

00:46:36,650 --> 00:46:34,920

of Retribution for any possible

522

00:46:38,450 --> 00:46:36,660

violations of previously signed

523

00:46:40,730 --> 00:46:38,460

non-disclosure agreements Congress

524

00:46:42,890 --> 00:46:40,740

mandated that arrow set up a publicly

525

00:46:45,109 --> 00:46:42,900

discoverable and accessible process for

526

00:46:46,910 --> 00:46:45,119

safe disclosure while we know that Arrow

527

00:46:48,890 --> 00:46:46,920

has already conducted a significant in a

528

00:46:50,569 --> 00:46:48,900

number of interviews many referred by

529

00:46:52,970 --> 00:46:50,579

Congress we need to set up a public

530

00:46:55,069 --> 00:46:52,980

process that that and we need to know

531

00:46:56,329 --> 00:46:55,079

where that effort stands with that I'd

532

00:46:58,309 --> 00:46:56,339

like to turn to Senator Ernst for her

533

00:47:00,710 --> 00:46:58,319

opening statement thank you madam chair

534

00:47:03,589 --> 00:47:00,720

and thank you Dr Kirkpatrick for your

535

00:47:05,990 --> 00:47:03,599

testimony today I'll keep these remarks

536

00:47:08,630 --> 00:47:06,000

very brief so that we have maximum time

537

00:47:10,490 --> 00:47:08,640

for your briefing the recent Downing of

538

00:47:12,050 --> 00:47:10,500

the Chinese surveillance surveillance

539

00:47:14,329 --> 00:47:12,060

balloon and three other objects

540

00:47:17,210 --> 00:47:14,339

underscores the need for domain

541

00:47:19,490 --> 00:47:17,220

awareness adversaries like China and

542

00:47:22,490 --> 00:47:19,500

Russia are working to hold U.S interests

543

00:47:25,609 --> 00:47:22,500

including our homeland at risk that's

544

00:47:27,650 --> 00:47:25,619

why your testimony is so important and I

545

00:47:30,109 --> 00:47:27,660

so look forward to a progress update on

546

00:47:31,849 --> 00:47:30,119

the establishment of your office as

547

00:47:33,829 --> 00:47:31,859

members know your office evolved from

548

00:47:36,710 --> 00:47:33,839

the navy-led unidentified aerial

549

00:47:39,170 --> 00:47:36,720

phenomena task force to the all-domain

550

00:47:42,050 --> 00:47:39,180

anomalous resolution office known as

551

00:47:44,829 --> 00:47:42,060

Arrow Dr Kirkpatrick your extensive

552

00:47:48,410 --> 00:47:44,839

background in science and technology

553

00:47:50,270 --> 00:47:48,420

research and development and space makes

554

00:47:53,030 --> 00:47:50,280

you well suited to discuss these

555

00:47:55,670 --> 00:47:53,040

emerging challenges my priority is that

556

00:47:59,030 --> 00:47:55,680

we understand the full range of threats

557

00:48:01,309 --> 00:47:59,040

posed by our adversaries in all domains

558

00:48:04,069 --> 00:48:01,319

that is what the Joint Force needs to be

559

00:48:06,470 --> 00:48:04,079

prepared to fight and win in defense of

560

00:48:08,390 --> 00:48:06,480

our nation this committee needs to know

561

00:48:11,030 --> 00:48:08,400

about Chinese or Russian advanced

562

00:48:13,130 --> 00:48:11,040

technology programs to exploit our

563

00:48:15,650 --> 00:48:13,140

vulnerabilities and it needs to know

564

00:48:18,050 --> 00:48:15,660

whether your office along with the IC

565

00:48:20,630 --> 00:48:18,060

has detected potential Chinese or

566

00:48:23,270 --> 00:48:20,640

Russian capabilities to surveil or

567

00:48:26,050 --> 00:48:23,280

attack us finally we need to ensure

568

00:48:29,809 --> 00:48:26,060

efficient interagency coordination

569

00:48:33,230 --> 00:48:29,819

multiple elements of the dod and IC own

570

00:48:36,230 --> 00:48:33,240

a piece of this mission to add value

571

00:48:38,630 --> 00:48:36,240

arrows efforts cannot be redundant with

572

00:48:41,270 --> 00:48:38,640

others thank you again we look forward

573

00:48:43,370 --> 00:48:41,280

to your testimony

574

00:48:45,470 --> 00:48:43,380

Dr Kirkpatrick you can give your

575

00:48:47,990 --> 00:48:45,480

testimony

576

00:48:49,970 --> 00:48:48,000

thank you chairwoman Jewel brand ranking

577

00:48:51,470 --> 00:48:49,980

member Ernst distinguished members of

578

00:48:53,089 --> 00:48:51,480

the subcommittee

579

00:48:55,910 --> 00:48:53,099

it's a privilege to be here today to

580

00:48:57,710 --> 00:48:55,920

testify on the defense defense's efforts

581

00:48:58,790 --> 00:48:57,720

to address unidentified anomalous

582

00:49:00,710 --> 00:48:58,800

phenomena

583

00:49:02,630 --> 00:49:00,720

first I want to thank Congress for its

584

00:49:04,010 --> 00:49:02,640

extensive and continued partnership as

585

00:49:06,589 --> 00:49:04,020

the department works to better

586

00:49:08,210 --> 00:49:06,599

understand and respond to UAP in an

587

00:49:09,829 --> 00:49:08,220

effort to minimize Technical and

588

00:49:12,530 --> 00:49:09,839

intelligence surprise

589

00:49:14,510 --> 00:49:12,540

unidentified objects in any domain pose

590

00:49:17,329 --> 00:49:14,520

potential risks to Safety and Security

591

00:49:18,589 --> 00:49:17,339

particularly from military personnel and

592

00:49:21,410 --> 00:49:18,599

capabilities

593

00:49:24,290 --> 00:49:21,420

Congress and DOD agree that UAP cannot

594

00:49:26,150 --> 00:49:24,300

remain unexamined or unaddressed

595

00:49:27,890 --> 00:49:26,160

we are grateful for sustained

596

00:49:29,990 --> 00:49:27,900

Congressional engagement on this issue

597

00:49:31,910 --> 00:49:30,000

which paved the way for the dod's

598

00:49:34,849 --> 00:49:31,920

establishment of the all-domain anomaly

599

00:49:37,490 --> 00:49:34,859

resolution office in July of last year

600

00:49:40,190 --> 00:49:37,500

though arrow is still a young office the

601  
00:49:42,050 --> 00:49:40,200  
spotlight on UAP in recent months

602  
00:49:44,690 --> 00:49:42,060  
underscores the importance of its work

603  
00:49:46,309 --> 00:49:44,700  
and the need for UAP to be taken

604  
00:49:47,690 --> 00:49:46,319  
seriously as a matter of National

605  
00:49:49,430 --> 00:49:47,700  
Security

606  
00:49:52,250 --> 00:49:49,440  
all leadership that I've had the

607  
00:49:55,430 --> 00:49:52,260  
pleasure of working with whether DOD IC

608  
00:49:57,349 --> 00:49:55,440  
doe civil scientific or industrial view

609  
00:49:58,730 --> 00:49:57,359  
Congress as a critical partner in this

610  
00:50:01,309 --> 00:49:58,740  
endeavor

611  
00:50:03,410 --> 00:50:01,319  
Arrow has accomplished much in the last

612  
00:50:05,390 --> 00:50:03,420  
nine months since it was established the

613  
00:50:07,849 --> 00:50:05,400

Aero team of more than three dozen

614

00:50:10,430 --> 00:50:07,859

experts is organized around four

615

00:50:12,589 --> 00:50:10,440

functional areas operations scientific

616

00:50:14,569 --> 00:50:12,599

research integrated analysis and

617

00:50:16,490 --> 00:50:14,579

strategic Communications

618

00:50:18,109 --> 00:50:16,500

in the nine months since era's

619

00:50:21,829 --> 00:50:18,119

establishment we've taken important

620

00:50:23,990 --> 00:50:21,839

steps to involve and improve UAP data

621

00:50:26,870 --> 00:50:24,000

collection standardize the Department's

622

00:50:28,550 --> 00:50:26,880

UAP internal reporting requirements and

623

00:50:31,370 --> 00:50:28,560

Implement a framework for rigorous

624

00:50:33,710 --> 00:50:31,380

scientific and intelligence analysis

625

00:50:36,290 --> 00:50:33,720

allowing us to resolve cases in a

626  
00:50:38,690 --> 00:50:36,300  
systematic and prioritized manner

627  
00:50:40,670 --> 00:50:38,700  
meanwhile consistent with legislative

628  
00:50:43,190 --> 00:50:40,680  
direction arrow is also carefully

629  
00:50:45,170 --> 00:50:43,200  
reviewing and researching the U.S

630  
00:50:46,609 --> 00:50:45,180  
government's UAP related historical

631  
00:50:48,829 --> 00:50:46,619  
record

632  
00:50:50,329 --> 00:50:48,839  
arrow is leading a focused effort to

633  
00:50:52,010 --> 00:50:50,339  
better characterize understand and

634  
00:50:54,530 --> 00:50:52,020  
attribute UAP

635  
00:50:58,069 --> 00:50:54,540  
with priority given the UAP reports by

636  
00:50:59,870 --> 00:50:58,079  
DOD and IC Personnel in or near areas of

637  
00:51:02,630 --> 00:50:59,880  
National Security importance

638  
00:51:03,530 --> 00:51:02,640

DOD fully appreciates the eagerness from

639

00:51:05,809 --> 00:51:03,540

many

640

00:51:07,250 --> 00:51:05,819

quarters especially here in Congress and

641

00:51:09,890 --> 00:51:07,260

in the American public to quickly

642

00:51:11,870 --> 00:51:09,900

resolve every UAP encountered across the

643

00:51:12,770 --> 00:51:11,880

globe from the distant pass through

644

00:51:14,990 --> 00:51:12,780

today

645

00:51:17,750 --> 00:51:15,000

it's important to note however

646

00:51:19,910 --> 00:51:17,760

arrow is the culmination of Decades of

647

00:51:21,650 --> 00:51:19,920

DOD intelligence community and

648

00:51:23,930 --> 00:51:21,660

congressionally directed efforts to

649

00:51:25,849 --> 00:51:23,940

successfully resolve UAP encountered

650

00:51:28,609 --> 00:51:25,859

first and foremost by U.S military

651  
00:51:29,990 --> 00:51:28,619  
personnel specifically Navy and Air

652  
00:51:32,390 --> 00:51:30,000  
Force pilots

653  
00:51:34,670 --> 00:51:32,400  
the law establishing arrow is ambitious

654  
00:51:37,490 --> 00:51:34,680  
and it will take time to realize the

655  
00:51:40,910 --> 00:51:37,500  
full mission we cannot answer Decades of

656  
00:51:43,430 --> 00:51:40,920  
questions about UAP all at once but we

657  
00:51:45,049 --> 00:51:43,440  
must begin somewhere while I assure you

658  
00:51:47,690 --> 00:51:45,059  
that Arrow will follow scientific

659  
00:51:50,270 --> 00:51:47,700  
evidence wherever it leads I ask for

660  
00:51:51,890 --> 00:51:50,280  
your patience as DOD first prioritizes

661  
00:51:54,170 --> 00:51:51,900  
Safety and Security of our military

662  
00:51:55,430 --> 00:51:54,180  
personnel and installations in all

663  
00:51:58,069 --> 00:51:55,440

domains

664

00:52:00,410 --> 00:51:58,079

after all a UAP encountered first by

665

00:52:02,690 --> 00:52:00,420

highly capable DOD and IC platforms

666

00:52:05,569 --> 00:52:02,700

featuring the nation's most advanced

667

00:52:08,150 --> 00:52:05,579

sensors are those UAP most likely to be

668

00:52:09,470 --> 00:52:08,160

resolved by my office assuming the data

669

00:52:11,990 --> 00:52:09,480

can be collected

670

00:52:14,150 --> 00:52:12,000

if Arrow succeeds in first improving the

671

00:52:16,430 --> 00:52:14,160

ability of military personnel to quickly

672

00:52:18,890 --> 00:52:16,440

and confidently resolve UAP they

673

00:52:20,870 --> 00:52:18,900

encounter I believe that in time we will

674

00:52:22,250 --> 00:52:20,880

have greatly Advanced the capability of

675

00:52:24,349 --> 00:52:22,260

the entire United States government

676  
00:52:25,849 --> 00:52:24,359  
including its civilian agencies to

677  
00:52:28,430 --> 00:52:25,859  
resolve UAP

678  
00:52:31,130 --> 00:52:28,440  
however it would be naive to believe

679  
00:52:33,349 --> 00:52:31,140  
that the resolution of all UAP can be

680  
00:52:34,130 --> 00:52:33,359  
solely accomplished by the dod and IC

681  
00:52:36,109 --> 00:52:34,140  
alone

682  
00:52:38,089 --> 00:52:36,119  
we will need to prioritize collection

683  
00:52:39,770 --> 00:52:38,099  
and leverage authorities for monitoring

684  
00:52:40,910 --> 00:52:39,780  
all domains within the continental

685  
00:52:43,010 --> 00:52:40,920  
United States

686  
00:52:44,809 --> 00:52:43,020  
Arrow's ultimate success will require

687  
00:52:47,450 --> 00:52:44,819  
Partnerships with the interagency

688  
00:52:49,130 --> 00:52:47,460

industry Partners Academia and the

689

00:52:50,150 --> 00:52:49,140

scientific Community as well as the

690

00:52:51,890 --> 00:52:50,160

public

691

00:52:54,230 --> 00:52:51,900

Aero is partnering with the services

692

00:52:55,790 --> 00:52:54,240

intelligence Community doe as well as

693

00:52:58,069 --> 00:52:55,800

civil partners and across the U.S

694

00:52:59,930 --> 00:52:58,079

government to tap into this resources of

695

00:53:02,630 --> 00:52:59,940

the interagency

696

00:53:05,210 --> 00:53:02,640

the UAP challenge is more an operational

697

00:53:06,710 --> 00:53:05,220

and scientific issue than it is an

698

00:53:08,990 --> 00:53:06,720

intelligence issue

699

00:53:10,910 --> 00:53:09,000

as such we are working with industry

700

00:53:13,190 --> 00:53:10,920

Academia and the scientific Community

701  
00:53:15,710 --> 00:53:13,200  
which bring their own resources ideas

702  
00:53:17,329 --> 00:53:15,720  
and expertise to this challenging

703  
00:53:19,549 --> 00:53:17,339  
problem set

704  
00:53:21,650 --> 00:53:19,559  
robust collaboration and peer review

705  
00:53:23,390 --> 00:53:21,660  
across a broad range of Partners will

706  
00:53:26,569 --> 00:53:23,400  
promote greater objectivity and

707  
00:53:28,910 --> 00:53:26,579  
transparency in the study of UAP

708  
00:53:31,370 --> 00:53:28,920  
I want to underscore today that only a

709  
00:53:33,650 --> 00:53:31,380  
very small percentage of UAP reports

710  
00:53:36,470 --> 00:53:33,660  
display signatures that could reasonably

711  
00:53:38,690 --> 00:53:36,480  
be described as anomalous the majority

712  
00:53:40,910 --> 00:53:38,700  
of unidentified objects reported to

713  
00:53:43,250 --> 00:53:40,920

Arrow demonstrate mundane

714

00:53:45,589 --> 00:53:43,260

characteristics of balloons unmanned

715

00:53:48,410 --> 00:53:45,599

aerial systems clutter natural phenomena

716

00:53:50,630 --> 00:53:48,420

other readily explainable sources

717

00:53:53,089 --> 00:53:50,640

while a large number of cases in our

718

00:53:56,030 --> 00:53:53,099

Holdings remain technically unresolved

719

00:53:58,309 --> 00:53:56,040

this is primarily due to a lack of data

720

00:54:00,530 --> 00:53:58,319

associated with those cases without

721

00:54:02,450 --> 00:54:00,540

sufficient data we are unable to reach

722

00:54:05,089 --> 00:54:02,460

defendable conclusions

723

00:54:07,309 --> 00:54:05,099

that meet the high scientific standards

724

00:54:09,349 --> 00:54:07,319

we set for resolution and I will not

725

00:54:10,970 --> 00:54:09,359

close a case that I cannot defend the

726

00:54:12,890 --> 00:54:10,980

conclusions of

727

00:54:15,170 --> 00:54:12,900

I recognize that this answer is

728

00:54:16,970 --> 00:54:15,180

unsatisfying to those who in good faith

729

00:54:18,770 --> 00:54:16,980

assume that what they see with their

730

00:54:21,049 --> 00:54:18,780

eyes with their cameras and what their

731

00:54:22,730 --> 00:54:21,059

Radars is incontrovertible evidence of

732

00:54:23,870 --> 00:54:22,740

extraordinary characteristics and

733

00:54:25,609 --> 00:54:23,880

performance

734

00:54:27,770 --> 00:54:25,619

yet time and again with sufficient

735

00:54:31,549 --> 00:54:27,780

scientific quality data it is fact that

736

00:54:34,069 --> 00:54:31,559

UAP often but not always resolve into

737

00:54:36,170 --> 00:54:34,079

readily explainable sources

738

00:54:38,089 --> 00:54:36,180

humans are subject to deception and

739

00:54:40,549 --> 00:54:38,099

Illusions sensors to unexpected

740

00:54:42,890 --> 00:54:40,559

responses and malfunctions and in some

741

00:54:44,930 --> 00:54:42,900

cases intentional interference

742

00:54:46,730 --> 00:54:44,940

getting to the handful of cases that

743

00:54:48,230 --> 00:54:46,740

pass this level of scrutiny is the

744

00:54:50,569 --> 00:54:48,240

mission of era

745

00:54:52,490 --> 00:54:50,579

that is not to say that UAP once

746

00:54:54,710 --> 00:54:52,500

resolved or no longer of National

747

00:54:56,990 --> 00:54:54,720

Security interest however on the

748

00:54:59,270 --> 00:54:57,000

contrary learning that a UAP isn't of

749

00:55:01,970 --> 00:54:59,280

exotic origin but is instead just a

750

00:55:03,470 --> 00:55:01,980

quadcopter or balloon leads to the

751  
00:55:06,230 --> 00:55:03,480  
question of who is operating that

752  
00:55:08,089 --> 00:55:06,240  
quadcopter into what purpose

753  
00:55:10,190 --> 00:55:08,099  
the answers to those questions will

754  
00:55:12,530 --> 00:55:10,200  
inform potential National Security or

755  
00:55:14,390 --> 00:55:12,540  
law enforcement responses

756  
00:55:16,010 --> 00:55:14,400  
arrow is a member of the Department's

757  
00:55:18,109 --> 00:55:16,020  
support to the administration's tiger

758  
00:55:20,210 --> 00:55:18,119  
team effort to deal with stratospheric

759  
00:55:21,589 --> 00:55:20,220  
objects such as the PRC high altitude

760  
00:55:24,770 --> 00:55:21,599  
balloon

761  
00:55:27,470 --> 00:55:24,780  
well when previously unknown objects are

762  
00:55:29,569 --> 00:55:27,480  
successfully identified it is Arrow's

763  
00:55:32,270 --> 00:55:29,579

role too quickly and efficiently hand

764

00:55:34,370 --> 00:55:32,280

off such readily explainable objects to

765

00:55:36,170 --> 00:55:34,380

the intelligence law enforcement or

766

00:55:39,109 --> 00:55:36,180

operational safety communities for

767

00:55:41,270 --> 00:55:39,119

further analysis and appropriate action

768

00:55:44,510 --> 00:55:41,280

in other words Arrow's mission is to

769

00:55:46,609 --> 00:55:44,520

turn UAP into SCP somebody else's

770

00:55:49,309 --> 00:55:46,619

problem

771

00:55:51,170 --> 00:55:49,319

the U.S government the dod and the IC in

772

00:55:53,329 --> 00:55:51,180

particular has tremendous capabilities

773

00:55:56,690 --> 00:55:53,339

to deal with those encountered objects

774

00:55:58,190 --> 00:55:56,700

in the wake of the PRC Hab event the

775

00:56:00,170 --> 00:55:58,200

interagency is working to better

776

00:56:01,030 --> 00:56:00,180

integrate and share information to

777

00:56:04,130 --> 00:56:01,040

address

778

00:56:06,470 --> 00:56:04,140

identifiable stratospheric objects but

779

00:56:08,809 --> 00:56:06,480

that is not all arrows Lane

780

00:56:11,329 --> 00:56:08,819

meanwhile for the few cases in all

781

00:56:13,069 --> 00:56:11,339

domains space air and sea

782

00:56:15,290 --> 00:56:13,079

that do demonstrate potentially

783

00:56:17,750 --> 00:56:15,300

anomalous characteristics Arrow exists

784

00:56:20,150 --> 00:56:17,760

to help the dod IC and interagency

785

00:56:22,609 --> 00:56:20,160

resolve those anomalous cases

786

00:56:24,109 --> 00:56:22,619

in doing so arrow is approaching these

787

00:56:26,990 --> 00:56:24,119

cases with the highest level of

788

00:56:28,670 --> 00:56:27,000

objectivity and analytic rigor this

789

00:56:30,170 --> 00:56:28,680

includes physically testing and

790

00:56:32,930 --> 00:56:30,180

employing modeling and simulation

791

00:56:34,730 --> 00:56:32,940

validate our analyzes and underlying

792

00:56:36,370 --> 00:56:34,740

theories then peer-reviewing those

793

00:56:38,510 --> 00:56:36,380

results within the US government

794

00:56:40,609 --> 00:56:38,520

industry partners and appropriately

795

00:56:42,829 --> 00:56:40,619

cleared academic institutions before

796

00:56:44,809 --> 00:56:42,839

reaching any conclusions

797

00:56:46,970 --> 00:56:44,819

I should also State clearly for the

798

00:56:49,430 --> 00:56:46,980

record that in our research Arrow has

799

00:56:51,530 --> 00:56:49,440

found no credible evidence thus far of

800

00:56:54,230 --> 00:56:51,540

extraterrestrial activity off-world

801  
00:56:55,849 --> 00:56:54,240  
technology or objects that defy the

802  
00:56:58,370 --> 00:56:55,859  
known laws of physics

803  
00:57:00,770 --> 00:56:58,380  
in the event sufficient scientific data

804  
00:57:02,809 --> 00:57:00,780  
were ever attained that a UAP

805  
00:57:05,210 --> 00:57:02,819  
encountered can only be explained by

806  
00:57:07,130 --> 00:57:05,220  
extraterrestrial origin we are committed

807  
00:57:09,890 --> 00:57:07,140  
to working with our interagency partners

808  
00:57:12,230 --> 00:57:09,900  
at Nasa to appropriately inform U.S

809  
00:57:14,809 --> 00:57:12,240  
government's leadership of its findings

810  
00:57:16,549 --> 00:57:14,819  
for those few cases that have leaked to

811  
00:57:19,010 --> 00:57:16,559  
the public previously and subsequently

812  
00:57:20,690 --> 00:57:19,020  
commented on by the U.S government I

813  
00:57:22,430 --> 00:57:20,700

encourage those who hold alternative

814

00:57:24,530 --> 00:57:22,440

theories or views to submit your

815

00:57:26,750 --> 00:57:24,540

research to Credible peer-reviewed

816

00:57:28,670 --> 00:57:26,760

scientific journals arrow is working

817

00:57:31,670 --> 00:57:28,680

very hard to do the same

818

00:57:32,990 --> 00:57:31,680

that is how science works not by blog or

819

00:57:34,970 --> 00:57:33,000

social media

820

00:57:37,609 --> 00:57:34,980

we know that there is tremendous public

821

00:57:40,849 --> 00:57:37,619

interest in UAP and a desire for answers

822

00:57:43,490 --> 00:57:40,859

from Arrow by its very nature the UAP

823

00:57:45,950 --> 00:57:43,500

challenge has for decades lent itself to

824

00:57:49,069 --> 00:57:45,960

mystery sensationalism and even

825

00:57:51,530 --> 00:57:49,079

conspiracy for that reason Arrow remains

826

00:57:53,569 --> 00:57:51,540

committed to transparency accountability

827

00:57:56,329 --> 00:57:53,579

and to sharing as much with the American

828

00:57:58,430 --> 00:57:56,339

public as we can consistent with Our

829

00:58:01,069 --> 00:57:58,440

obligation to protect and not only

830

00:58:03,290 --> 00:58:01,079

intelligence sources and methods but U.S

831

00:58:06,170 --> 00:58:03,300

and Allied capabilities

832

00:58:08,510 --> 00:58:06,180

however Arrow's work will take time if

833

00:58:10,730 --> 00:58:08,520

we are committed to do it right it means

834

00:58:12,109 --> 00:58:10,740

adhering to the scientific method and

835

00:58:15,109 --> 00:58:12,119

the highest standards of research

836

00:58:17,329 --> 00:58:15,119

Integrity it means being methodical and

837

00:58:19,730 --> 00:58:17,339

scrupulous it means withholding judgment

838

00:58:21,829 --> 00:58:19,740

in favor of evidence it means following

839

00:58:24,410 --> 00:58:21,839

the data where it leads wherever it

840

00:58:26,450 --> 00:58:24,420

leads it means establishing scientific

841

00:58:28,130 --> 00:58:26,460

peer-reviewed theoretical underpinnings

842

00:58:30,530 --> 00:58:28,140

of observed data

843

00:58:31,670 --> 00:58:30,540

an arrow is committed to all of those

844

00:58:33,589 --> 00:58:31,680

standards

845

00:58:36,470 --> 00:58:33,599

I'm proud of Arrow's progress over the

846

00:58:38,809 --> 00:58:36,480

last nine months much remains to

847

00:58:41,450 --> 00:58:38,819

be done but the hard work is underway

848

00:58:43,190 --> 00:58:41,460

thank you for your continued support and

849

00:58:45,109 --> 00:58:43,200

before we turn to questions I want to

850

00:58:46,970 --> 00:58:45,119

walk you through some of our analytical

851  
00:58:51,410 --> 00:58:46,980  
Trends in a couple of cases that we've

852  
00:58:58,250 --> 00:58:54,309  
so one of the things that Arrow does is

853  
00:59:00,890 --> 00:58:58,260  
high integrity analysis as I've said

854  
00:59:04,970 --> 00:59:00,900  
this chart represents

855  
00:59:07,970 --> 00:59:04,980  
the trend analysis of all the cases in

856  
00:59:10,789 --> 00:59:07,980  
arrows Holdings right to date

857  
00:59:13,490 --> 00:59:10,799  
what you'll see on the left is a

858  
00:59:17,230 --> 00:59:13,500  
histogram of all of our reported

859  
00:59:22,730 --> 00:59:17,240  
sightings as a function of altitude

860  
00:59:23,990 --> 00:59:22,740  
so most of our sightings occur in the 15

861  
00:59:26,390 --> 00:59:24,000  
to 25

862  
00:59:27,710 --> 00:59:26,400  
000 foot range and that is ultimately

863  
00:59:30,109 --> 00:59:27,720

because that's where a lot of our

864

00:59:33,109 --> 00:59:30,119

aircraft are

865

00:59:36,289 --> 00:59:33,119

on the far right upper corner you'll see

866

00:59:39,349 --> 00:59:36,299

a breakout of the morphologies of all of

867

00:59:42,109 --> 00:59:39,359

the UAP that are reported over half

868

00:59:47,390 --> 00:59:42,119

about 52 percent of what's been reported

869

00:59:49,849 --> 00:59:47,400

to us are round orb spheres

870

00:59:51,950 --> 00:59:49,859

the rest of those break out into all

871

00:59:53,710 --> 00:59:51,960

kinds of different other shapes the gray

872

00:59:57,049 --> 00:59:53,720

box is

873

00:59:59,270 --> 00:59:57,059

essentially there's no data on what its

874

01:00:01,910 --> 00:59:59,280

shape is either it wasn't reported or

875

01:00:05,569 --> 01:00:01,920

the sensor did not collect it

876  
01:00:08,150 --> 01:00:05,579  
the bottom map is a heat map of all

877  
01:00:10,609 --> 01:00:08,160  
reporting areas across the globe that we

878  
01:00:13,490 --> 01:00:10,619  
have available to us

879  
01:00:16,309 --> 01:00:13,500  
what you'll notice is that there is a

880  
01:00:19,510 --> 01:00:16,319  
heavy what we call collection bias both

881  
01:00:23,210 --> 01:00:19,520  
in altitude and in geographic location

882  
01:00:25,250 --> 01:00:23,220  
that's where all of our sensors exist

883  
01:00:27,109 --> 01:00:25,260  
that's where our training ranges are

884  
01:00:30,710 --> 01:00:27,119  
that's where our operational ranges are

885  
01:00:33,530 --> 01:00:30,720  
that's where all of our platforms are

886  
01:00:37,210 --> 01:00:33,540  
in the middle what we have done is

887  
01:00:41,930 --> 01:00:37,220  
reduce the most typically reported UAP

888  
01:00:44,930 --> 01:00:41,940

characteristics to these fields mostly

889

01:00:47,390 --> 01:00:44,940

round mostly one to four meters white

890

01:00:50,329 --> 01:00:47,400

silver translucent metallic

891

01:00:52,609 --> 01:00:50,339

ten thousand thirty thousand feet

892

01:00:55,730 --> 01:00:52,619

with apparent velocities from the

893

01:00:58,490 --> 01:00:55,740

stationary to Mach 2. no thermal

894

01:01:01,190 --> 01:00:58,500

exhausts usually detected we get

895

01:01:04,190 --> 01:01:01,200

intermittent radar returns we get

896

01:01:06,770 --> 01:01:04,200

intermittent radio returns and we get

897

01:01:09,230 --> 01:01:06,780

intermittent thermal signatures

898

01:01:12,530 --> 01:01:09,240

that's what we're looking for and trying

899

01:01:12,540 --> 01:01:15,770

next slide

900

01:01:21,789 --> 01:01:18,170

so I'm going to walk you through two

901  
01:01:25,490 --> 01:01:21,799  
cases that we've Declassified recently

902  
01:01:28,789 --> 01:01:25,500  
this first one is an MQ-9 in the Middle

903  
01:01:31,910 --> 01:01:28,799  
East observing that blow up which is an

904  
01:01:35,329 --> 01:01:31,920  
apparent spherical object via EO sensors

905  
01:01:39,950 --> 01:01:36,770  
if you want to go ahead and click that

906  
01:01:44,450 --> 01:01:42,349  
you'll see it come through the top of

907  
01:01:47,750 --> 01:01:44,460  
the screen there it goes and then the

908  
01:01:49,849 --> 01:01:47,760  
camera will slew to follow it

909  
01:01:52,069 --> 01:01:49,859  
you'll see it pop in and out of the

910  
01:01:54,589 --> 01:01:52,079  
screw field of view there

911  
01:01:56,329 --> 01:01:54,599  
this is essentially all of the data we

912  
01:01:59,270 --> 01:01:56,339  
have associated with this event from

913  
01:02:04,130 --> 01:02:01,309

it is going to be virtually impossible

914

01:02:06,410 --> 01:02:04,140  
to fully identify that

915

01:02:08,690 --> 01:02:06,420  
just based off of that video

916

01:02:12,349 --> 01:02:08,700  
now what we can do and what we are doing

917

01:02:15,230 --> 01:02:12,359  
is keeping that as part of that

918

01:02:18,170 --> 01:02:15,240  
group of 52 percent

919

01:02:20,270 --> 01:02:18,180  
to see what are the similarities what

920

01:02:22,309 --> 01:02:20,280  
are the trends across all these do we

921

01:02:25,130 --> 01:02:22,319  
see these in a particular distribution

922

01:02:27,770 --> 01:02:25,140  
do they all behave the same or not

923

01:02:29,750 --> 01:02:27,780  
as we get more data

924

01:02:32,690 --> 01:02:29,760  
we will be able to go back and look at

925

01:02:35,329 --> 01:02:32,700  
these in a fuller context

926  
01:02:37,549 --> 01:02:35,339  
how are we going to get more data we are

927  
01:02:39,589 --> 01:02:37,559  
working with the joint staff to issue

928  
01:02:42,710 --> 01:02:39,599  
guidance to all the services and

929  
01:02:44,329 --> 01:02:42,720  
commands that will then establish what

930  
01:02:46,370 --> 01:02:44,339  
are the reporting requirements the

931  
01:02:48,710 --> 01:02:46,380  
timeliness and all of the data that is

932  
01:02:52,609 --> 01:02:48,720  
required to be delivered to us and

933  
01:02:54,710 --> 01:02:52,619  
retained from all the associated sensors

934  
01:02:56,809 --> 01:02:54,720  
that historically hasn't been the case

935  
01:02:59,150 --> 01:02:56,819  
and it's been happenstance that data has

936  
01:03:01,750 --> 01:02:59,160  
been collected

937  
01:03:06,549 --> 01:03:01,760  
next slide

938  
01:03:10,069 --> 01:03:06,559

this particular event South Asia MQ-9

939

01:03:12,410 --> 01:03:10,079

looking at another MQ-9 and what's

940

01:03:15,289 --> 01:03:12,420

highlighted there in that red circle is

941

01:03:17,809 --> 01:03:15,299

an object that flies through the screen

942

01:03:19,789 --> 01:03:17,819

unlike the previous one

943

01:03:21,470 --> 01:03:19,799

this one actually shows some really

944

01:03:24,530 --> 01:03:21,480

interesting things that everyone thought

945

01:03:26,750 --> 01:03:24,540

was truly anomalous to start with first

946

01:03:29,030 --> 01:03:26,760

of all it's a high-speed object that's

947

01:03:32,930 --> 01:03:29,040

flying in the field of regard of two

948

01:03:35,390 --> 01:03:32,940

mq-9s second it appears to have this

949

01:03:37,849 --> 01:03:35,400

trail behind it

950

01:03:41,569 --> 01:03:37,859

all right which at first blush you would

951  
01:03:45,410 --> 01:03:41,579  
think that looks like a propulsion Trail

952  
01:03:47,150 --> 01:03:45,420  
in reality if you want to play the first

953  
01:03:49,670 --> 01:03:47,160  
slide we'll show you what that looks

954  
01:03:53,089 --> 01:03:49,680  
like in real time or first video so

955  
01:03:54,950 --> 01:03:53,099  
we're looking at that there it goes

956  
01:03:56,809 --> 01:03:54,960  
once you play it again and then pause it

957  
01:03:58,490 --> 01:03:56,819  
halfway through

958  
01:04:00,170 --> 01:03:58,500  
right there

959  
01:04:02,990 --> 01:04:00,180  
all right if you might be able to see

960  
01:04:05,569 --> 01:04:03,000  
that trail there behind it

961  
01:04:08,589 --> 01:04:05,579  
that's actually not a real trail that is

962  
01:04:11,089 --> 01:04:08,599  
a sensor artifact

963  
01:04:13,370 --> 01:04:11,099

each one of those little blobs is

964

01:04:15,589 --> 01:04:13,380

actually a representation of the object

965

01:04:18,289 --> 01:04:15,599

as it's moving through and later in the

966

01:04:22,670 --> 01:04:18,299

video as the

967

01:04:25,190 --> 01:04:22,680

as the camera slews that trail actually

968

01:04:29,089 --> 01:04:25,200

follows the direction of the camera not

969

01:04:31,549 --> 01:04:29,099

the direction of the object

970

01:04:33,289 --> 01:04:31,559

we pulled these apart frame by frame we

971

01:04:36,650 --> 01:04:33,299

were able to demonstrate that that is

972

01:04:38,690 --> 01:04:36,660

essentially a readout uh overlap of the

973

01:04:40,190 --> 01:04:38,700

image it's a it's a shadow image right

974

01:04:42,190 --> 01:04:40,200

it's not real

975

01:04:45,289 --> 01:04:42,200

further if you later

976

01:04:48,410 --> 01:04:45,299

follow this all the way to end it starts

977

01:04:50,210 --> 01:04:48,420

to resolve itself into that blob that's

978

01:04:52,430 --> 01:04:50,220

in that picture in the top of the right

979

01:04:54,230 --> 01:04:52,440

and if you squint it looks like an

980

01:04:55,970 --> 01:04:54,240

aircraft because it actually turns out

981

01:04:58,849 --> 01:04:55,980

to be an aircraft go ahead and put that

982

01:05:03,770 --> 01:05:01,309

so you'll see the tail sort of pop out

983

01:05:06,170 --> 01:05:03,780

there and so what you're looking at is

984

01:05:08,210 --> 01:05:06,180

this is in the infrared this is the Heat

985

01:05:10,490 --> 01:05:08,220

Signature off of the

986

01:05:12,349 --> 01:05:10,500

engines of a commuter aircraft that

987

01:05:15,890 --> 01:05:12,359

happen to be flying in the vicinity of

988

01:05:18,410 --> 01:05:15,900

where those two mq-9s were at

989

01:05:20,089 --> 01:05:18,420

why am i showing you this so the first

990

01:05:22,789 --> 01:05:20,099

one that I showed you we don't have a

991

01:05:26,210 --> 01:05:22,799

result yet right that is an unresolved

992

01:05:29,030 --> 01:05:26,220

case we are still studying this one we

993

01:05:31,130 --> 01:05:29,040

can resolve but this is the kind of data

994

01:05:33,770 --> 01:05:31,140

that we have to work with and the type

995

01:05:35,809 --> 01:05:33,780

of analysis that we have to do which can

996

01:05:38,630 --> 01:05:35,819

be quite extensive when you have to pull

997

01:05:41,630 --> 01:05:38,640

these apart frame by frame

998

01:05:44,690 --> 01:05:41,640

further we're now matching all of this

999

01:05:47,930 --> 01:05:44,700

with the models of all of those Imaging

1000

01:05:50,510 --> 01:05:47,940

sensors so that I can say I can recreate

1001

01:05:52,250 --> 01:05:50,520

this I can actually show how the sensor

1002

01:05:54,589 --> 01:05:52,260

is going to respond

1003

01:05:57,589 --> 01:05:54,599

all of these sensors don't necessarily

1004

01:05:59,690 --> 01:05:57,599

respond the way you think they do

1005

01:06:03,049 --> 01:05:59,700

especially out in the world and in the

1006

01:06:07,069 --> 01:06:04,910

and I believe that's all I have and I

1007

01:06:10,490 --> 01:06:07,079

will open it up for your questions

1008

01:06:12,829 --> 01:06:10,500

thank you so much Dr crew Patrick can

1009

01:06:16,970 --> 01:06:12,839

you just give us some raw numbers of how

1010

01:06:18,589 --> 01:06:16,980

many uaps you've analyzed how many have

1011

01:06:20,329 --> 01:06:18,599

been resolved and sort of in what

1012

01:06:22,690 --> 01:06:20,339

buckets and then how many are still left

1013

01:06:25,970 --> 01:06:22,700

to be resolved just an update from your

1014

01:06:29,109 --> 01:06:25,980

January public report where it was 366

1015

01:06:31,789 --> 01:06:29,119

or something in about 150 were were

1016

01:06:33,410 --> 01:06:31,799

balloons in about two dozen were drones

1017

01:06:37,549 --> 01:06:33,420

you know just give us an update if you

1018

01:06:43,250 --> 01:06:37,559

have one sure so as of this week we are

1019

01:06:46,730 --> 01:06:43,260

tracking over a total of 650 cases

1020

01:06:48,770 --> 01:06:46,740

now the report in January basically said

1021

01:06:51,710 --> 01:06:48,780

about half of the ones at that time

1022

01:06:54,109 --> 01:06:51,720

about 150 were balloon were likely

1023

01:06:56,690 --> 01:06:54,119

balloon-like or something like that that

1024

01:06:58,849 --> 01:06:56,700

doesn't mean they're resolved oh okay so

1025

01:07:02,329 --> 01:06:58,859

what let me let me walk everyone through

1026

01:07:04,430 --> 01:07:02,339

what our analytic process looks like

1027

01:07:07,430 --> 01:07:04,440

we have a essentially a

1028

01:07:09,890 --> 01:07:07,440

five-step process right so we have we

1029

01:07:14,690 --> 01:07:09,900

get our cases and with all the data we

1030

01:07:18,289 --> 01:07:14,700

create a case uh for that event

1031

01:07:21,170 --> 01:07:18,299

my team does a preliminary scrub of all

1032

01:07:23,750 --> 01:07:21,180

of those cases as they come in just to

1033

01:07:26,510 --> 01:07:23,760

sort out do we have any information that

1034

01:07:28,549 --> 01:07:26,520

says this is in one of those likely

1035

01:07:31,430 --> 01:07:28,559

categories it's likely a balloon it's

1036

01:07:33,349 --> 01:07:31,440

likely a balloon a bird it's likely

1037

01:07:36,170 --> 01:07:33,359

some other object

1038

01:07:40,250 --> 01:07:36,180

or we don't know

1039

01:07:42,950 --> 01:07:40,260

then we prioritize those based off of

1040

01:07:44,930 --> 01:07:42,960

where they are are they attached to a

1041

01:07:48,010 --> 01:07:44,940

national security area

1042

01:07:50,809 --> 01:07:48,020

does it show some anomalous

1043

01:07:52,789 --> 01:07:50,819

phenomenology that is of interest if

1044

01:07:55,490 --> 01:07:52,799

it's just if it's just a spherical thing

1045

01:07:58,069 --> 01:07:55,500

that's floating around with the with the

1046

01:07:59,450 --> 01:07:58,079

wind and it has no payload on it that's

1047

01:08:01,370 --> 01:07:59,460

going to be less important than

1048

01:08:02,750 --> 01:08:01,380

something that has a payload on it which

1049

01:08:04,250 --> 01:08:02,760

would be less important than something

1050

01:08:06,349 --> 01:08:04,260

that's maneuvering

1051

01:08:08,510 --> 01:08:06,359

right so there's there's sort of a

1052

01:08:12,529 --> 01:08:08,520

hierarchy of just binning the priorities

1053

01:08:14,809 --> 01:08:12,539

because we can't do all of them at once

1054

01:08:16,669 --> 01:08:14,819

once we do that and we prioritize them

1055

01:08:19,249 --> 01:08:16,679

when we take that package of data in

1056

01:08:21,590 --> 01:08:19,259

that case and I have set up two teams

1057

01:08:24,110 --> 01:08:21,600

I'll think of this as a red team blue

1058

01:08:26,209 --> 01:08:24,120

team or a competitive analysis

1059

01:08:29,269 --> 01:08:26,219

I have an intelligence Community team

1060

01:08:32,150 --> 01:08:29,279

made up of intelligence analysts and I

1061

01:08:33,410 --> 01:08:32,160

have an s t team made up of scientists

1062

01:08:35,390 --> 01:08:33,420

and engineers and the people that

1063

01:08:37,370 --> 01:08:35,400

actually build a lot of these sensors or

1064

01:08:40,430 --> 01:08:37,380

physicists because you know if you're a

1065

01:08:41,269 --> 01:08:40,440

physicist you can do anything right

1066

01:08:44,450 --> 01:08:41,279

um

1067

01:08:46,910 --> 01:08:44,460

and but they're not associated with the

1068

01:08:49,070 --> 01:08:46,920

Intel Community they're not Intel

1069

01:08:51,229 --> 01:08:49,080

officers so they they look at this

1070

01:08:53,570 --> 01:08:51,239

through the lens of the sensor of the

1071

01:08:55,550 --> 01:08:53,580

what the data says we give that package

1072

01:08:57,289 --> 01:08:55,560

to both teams

1073

01:08:58,550 --> 01:08:57,299

the intelligence Community is going to

1074

01:09:00,410 --> 01:08:58,560

look at it through the lens of the

1075

01:09:03,349 --> 01:09:00,420

intelligence record and and what they

1076

01:09:05,030 --> 01:09:03,359

assess and their Intel tradecraft which

1077

01:09:06,709 --> 01:09:05,040

they have very specific rules and

1078

01:09:08,809 --> 01:09:06,719

regulations on how they do that

1079

01:09:10,430 --> 01:09:08,819

scientific Community Technical Community

1080

01:09:12,950 --> 01:09:10,440

is going to look at it through the lens

1081

01:09:15,709 --> 01:09:12,960

of what is the data telling me what is

1082

01:09:17,870 --> 01:09:15,719

the sensor doing what would I expect a

1083

01:09:20,809 --> 01:09:17,880

sensor response to be

1084

01:09:25,130 --> 01:09:20,819

and back that out those two groups give

1085

01:09:28,490 --> 01:09:25,140

us their answers we then adjudicate

1086

01:09:30,709 --> 01:09:28,500

if they agree then I am more likely to

1087

01:09:33,410 --> 01:09:30,719

close that case if they agree on what it

1088

01:09:35,209 --> 01:09:33,420

is if they disagree we will have an

1089

01:09:36,769 --> 01:09:35,219

adjudication we'll bring them together

1090

01:09:39,950 --> 01:09:36,779

we'll take a look at the differences

1091

01:09:41,570 --> 01:09:39,960

we'll adjudicate what why do you say one

1092

01:09:43,849 --> 01:09:41,580

thing and you say another

1093

01:09:46,729 --> 01:09:43,859

we will then come to a case

1094

01:09:49,189 --> 01:09:46,739

recommendation

1095

01:09:52,430 --> 01:09:49,199

that'll get written up by my team

1096

01:09:54,289 --> 01:09:52,440

that then goes to a senior technical

1097

01:09:56,110 --> 01:09:54,299

Advisory Group

1098

01:09:59,630 --> 01:09:56,120

which is outside of all of those people

1099

01:10:00,550 --> 01:09:59,640

made up of senior technical folks and

1100

01:10:07,689 --> 01:10:00,560

and

1101  
01:10:10,610 --> 01:10:07,699  
retired out of the community

1102  
01:10:15,050 --> 01:10:10,620  
and they they essentially peer review

1103  
01:10:16,970 --> 01:10:15,060  
what that case recommendation is

1104  
01:10:19,669 --> 01:10:16,980  
they write their recommendations that

1105  
01:10:21,530 --> 01:10:19,679  
comes back to me I review it we make a

1106  
01:10:23,810 --> 01:10:21,540  
determination and I'll sign off one way

1107  
01:10:27,770 --> 01:10:23,820  
or the other and then that will go out

1108  
01:10:30,709 --> 01:10:27,780  
as the the case determination once we

1109  
01:10:33,050 --> 01:10:30,719  
have an approved web portal to hang the

1110  
01:10:34,910 --> 01:10:33,060  
unclassified stuff we will D you know we

1111  
01:10:36,470 --> 01:10:34,920  
would downgrade and declassify things

1112  
01:10:38,630 --> 01:10:36,480  
and put it out there

1113  
01:10:41,750 --> 01:10:38,640

in the meantime we're putting a lot of

1114

01:10:43,610 --> 01:10:41,760

these on our classified web portal where

1115

01:10:45,050 --> 01:10:43,620

we can then collaborate with the rest of

1116

01:10:46,910 --> 01:10:45,060

the community so they can see what's

1117

01:10:50,270 --> 01:10:46,920

going on

1118

01:10:54,350 --> 01:10:50,280

that's in a nutshell that is the process

1119

01:10:58,850 --> 01:10:56,810

because of that

1120

01:11:02,510 --> 01:10:58,860

that takes time

1121

01:11:04,610 --> 01:11:02,520

so of those over 650 you know we've

1122

01:11:10,130 --> 01:11:04,620

prioritized

1123

01:11:13,550 --> 01:11:10,140

about uh half of them to be of of

1124

01:11:15,169 --> 01:11:13,560

um anomalous interesting value

1125

01:11:17,330 --> 01:11:15,179

and now we have to go through those and

1126  
01:11:21,050 --> 01:11:17,340  
go how much do I have actual data for

1127  
01:11:25,010 --> 01:11:21,060  
because if all I have is a is a operator

1128  
01:11:28,490 --> 01:11:25,020  
report that says I saw X Y or Z my

1129  
01:11:30,350 --> 01:11:28,500  
assessment is a b or c that's not really

1130  
01:11:33,410 --> 01:11:30,360  
sufficient that's a good place to start

1131  
01:11:35,510 --> 01:11:33,420  
but I have to have data I have to have

1132  
01:11:37,070 --> 01:11:35,520  
radar data I have to have EO data I have

1133  
01:11:39,830 --> 01:11:37,080  
to have thermal data I have to have

1134  
01:11:41,390 --> 01:11:39,840  
overhead data and we need to look at all

1135  
01:11:44,209 --> 01:11:41,400  
that

1136  
01:11:46,070 --> 01:11:44,219  
now from a big picture perspective I

1137  
01:11:47,510 --> 01:11:46,080  
still have that's all very still very

1138  
01:11:50,030 --> 01:11:47,520

valuable data

1139

01:11:53,450 --> 01:11:50,040

and we're looking at applying a lot of

1140

01:11:56,270 --> 01:11:53,460

things new tools analytic tools like

1141

01:11:59,270 --> 01:11:56,280

natural language processing so I can go

1142

01:12:02,090 --> 01:11:59,280

across all of those reports and look for

1143

01:12:04,610 --> 01:12:02,100

commonalities how many of them are being

1144

01:12:06,110 --> 01:12:04,620

described as round spherical objects

1145

01:12:07,910 --> 01:12:06,120

that are maneuvering how many of them

1146

01:12:12,169 --> 01:12:07,920

are not maneuvering how many of them

1147

01:12:14,930 --> 01:12:12,179

seem to have a plume to it or no

1148

01:12:16,669 --> 01:12:14,940

that's also going to be very valuable to

1149

01:12:19,149 --> 01:12:16,679

give us more of a global picture and a

1150

01:12:22,370 --> 01:12:19,159

Trends analysis of what are we seeing

1151

01:12:25,250 --> 01:12:22,380

and help us get to the determination

1152

01:12:26,090 --> 01:12:25,260

so go back to your question ma'am we

1153

01:12:27,430 --> 01:12:26,100

have

1154

01:12:30,110 --> 01:12:27,440

um

1155

01:12:32,030 --> 01:12:30,120

this next quarterly report will be

1156

01:12:33,790 --> 01:12:32,040

coming out here pretty soon our next

1157

01:12:38,750 --> 01:12:33,800

annual report

1158

01:12:40,910 --> 01:12:38,760

you all have given us moved it up to to

1159

01:12:44,090 --> 01:12:40,920

June July we're going to be having that

1160

01:12:46,550 --> 01:12:44,100

done about that time frame and we will

1161

01:12:48,830 --> 01:12:46,560

have a we'll be combining a whole number

1162

01:12:52,610 --> 01:12:48,840

of reports into that one

1163

01:12:56,689 --> 01:12:52,620

uh uh I think we're currently sitting at

1164

01:13:02,570 --> 01:12:58,970

if I remember correct we were around

1165

01:13:04,610 --> 01:13:02,580

20 to 30-ish or about halfway through

1166

01:13:06,470 --> 01:13:04,620

that analytic process

1167

01:13:08,030 --> 01:13:06,480

a handful of them have made it all the

1168

01:13:10,669 --> 01:13:08,040

way out to the other side gone through

1169

01:13:13,070 --> 01:13:10,679

peer review we've got case closure

1170

01:13:15,770 --> 01:13:13,080

reports done and signed

1171

01:13:18,770 --> 01:13:15,780

we're going to get faster as we get more

1172

01:13:21,830 --> 01:13:18,780

people on board and we get more of the

1173

01:13:25,330 --> 01:13:21,840

community tools to automate some of the

1174

01:13:31,250 --> 01:13:28,330

yeah thank you madam chair and Dr

1175

01:13:34,070 --> 01:13:31,260

Kirkpatrick the odni annual threat

1176  
01:13:37,189 --> 01:13:34,080  
assessment states that China's space

1177  
01:13:40,030 --> 01:13:37,199  
activities are designed to erode U.S

1178  
01:13:43,370 --> 01:13:40,040  
influence across military technological

1179  
01:13:45,649 --> 01:13:43,380  
economic and diplomatic spheres likewise

1180  
01:13:48,830 --> 01:13:45,659  
Russia will remain a key space

1181  
01:13:51,169 --> 01:13:48,840  
competitor in the course of your work

1182  
01:13:54,050 --> 01:13:51,179  
have you become aware of any Chinese or

1183  
01:13:57,470 --> 01:13:54,060  
Russia technical advancements to surveil

1184  
01:14:00,470 --> 01:13:57,480  
or attack U.S interests

1185  
01:14:02,990 --> 01:14:00,480  
so that's a great question part of what

1186  
01:14:05,950 --> 01:14:03,000  
we have to do as we go through these

1187  
01:14:08,209 --> 01:14:05,960  
especially the ones that show

1188  
01:14:11,090 --> 01:14:08,219

signatures of advanced technical

1189

01:14:13,610 --> 01:14:11,100

capabilities is determine if there's a

1190

01:14:16,910 --> 01:14:13,620

foreign Nexus

1191

01:14:19,430 --> 01:14:16,920

that's really hard if what we observe

1192

01:14:21,890 --> 01:14:19,440

doesn't have a Chinese or Russian flag

1193

01:14:23,750 --> 01:14:21,900

on the side of it

1194

01:14:25,669 --> 01:14:23,760

now

1195

01:14:26,330 --> 01:14:25,679

I think it is

1196

01:14:28,669 --> 01:14:26,340

um

1197

01:14:34,010 --> 01:14:28,679

prudent to say

1198

01:14:35,990 --> 01:14:34,020

of the of the cases that are showing

1199

01:14:38,209 --> 01:14:36,000

it you know some sort of advanced

1200

01:14:40,550 --> 01:14:38,219

technical signature of which we're

1201  
01:14:44,390 --> 01:14:40,560  
talking single percentages of the entire

1202  
01:14:48,530 --> 01:14:44,400  
population of cases we have

1203  
01:14:51,770 --> 01:14:48,540  
um I am concerned about

1204  
01:14:54,290 --> 01:14:51,780  
what that Nexus is and I have indicators

1205  
01:14:56,450 --> 01:14:54,300  
that some are related to foreign

1206  
01:14:59,450 --> 01:14:56,460  
capabilities

1207  
01:15:00,770 --> 01:14:59,460  
we have to investigate that with our IC

1208  
01:15:03,410 --> 01:15:00,780  
partners

1209  
01:15:05,510 --> 01:15:03,420  
and as we get evidence to support that

1210  
01:15:09,649 --> 01:15:05,520  
that gets then handed off to the

1211  
01:15:12,169 --> 01:15:09,659  
appropriate IC agency to investigate

1212  
01:15:14,750 --> 01:15:12,179  
again it becomes an SCP at that point

1213  
01:15:19,550 --> 01:15:14,760

yeah somebody else's problem right very

1214

01:15:22,010 --> 01:15:19,560

good thank you yes is it is it is it

1215

01:15:24,530 --> 01:15:22,020

possible that the Chinese or Russian

1216

01:15:26,450 --> 01:15:24,540

Advanced Technologies could could be

1217

01:15:29,689 --> 01:15:26,460

causing some of these anomalous

1218

01:15:35,030 --> 01:15:29,699

behaviors and and you said there seems

1219

01:15:37,850 --> 01:15:35,040

to be some indicators uh so just for us

1220

01:15:40,189 --> 01:15:37,860

today could you describe Potential

1221

01:15:44,630 --> 01:15:40,199

Threat that might exist out there if

1222

01:15:48,669 --> 01:15:46,790

in order to do this research

1223

01:15:52,729 --> 01:15:48,679

appropriately

1224

01:15:54,169 --> 01:15:52,739

we have to also be cognizant of what is

1225

01:15:57,890 --> 01:15:54,179

the state of the art and Development

1226  
01:15:59,810 --> 01:15:57,900  
Across the s t Community what is what

1227  
01:16:03,430 --> 01:15:59,820  
are the darpas of the world doing what

1228  
01:16:06,590 --> 01:16:03,440  
are our What's the horizon scanning of

1229  
01:16:09,350 --> 01:16:06,600  
emerging Technologies appropriate to

1230  
01:16:11,930 --> 01:16:09,360  
this subcommittee what is happening out

1231  
01:16:14,689 --> 01:16:11,940  
there and if somebody could accelerate

1232  
01:16:16,490 --> 01:16:14,699  
that capability how would that manifest

1233  
01:16:18,590 --> 01:16:16,500  
itself and what would it look like and

1234  
01:16:20,229 --> 01:16:18,600  
do those signatures match what we're

1235  
01:16:23,510 --> 01:16:20,239  
seeing

1236  
01:16:28,070 --> 01:16:23,520  
there are emerging capabilities out

1237  
01:16:30,830 --> 01:16:28,080  
there that that in many instances

1238  
01:16:32,689 --> 01:16:30,840

Russia and China well China in

1239

01:16:36,590 --> 01:16:32,699

particular are

1240

01:16:39,169 --> 01:16:36,600

on par or ahead of us in some areas

1241

01:16:41,209 --> 01:16:39,179

all right so previously I used to be the

1242

01:16:42,770 --> 01:16:41,219

defense Department's intelligence

1243

01:16:45,290 --> 01:16:42,780

officer for Science and Technical

1244

01:16:48,649 --> 01:16:45,300

intelligence that was our job was to

1245

01:16:51,649 --> 01:16:48,659

look for what does all that look like

1246

01:16:54,110 --> 01:16:51,659

um and then you know my last several

1247

01:16:57,490 --> 01:16:54,120

years of course in in space command

1248

01:17:04,189 --> 01:17:02,270

the the adversary is not

1249

01:17:06,229 --> 01:17:04,199

waiting

1250

01:17:07,610 --> 01:17:06,239

they are advancing and they're advancing

1251

01:17:09,830 --> 01:17:07,620

quickly

1252

01:17:11,330 --> 01:17:09,840

if I were to put on some of my old hats

1253

01:17:15,110 --> 01:17:11,340

I would tell you

1254

01:17:18,169 --> 01:17:15,120

they are less risk-averse at technical

1255

01:17:20,750 --> 01:17:18,179

advancement than we are

1256

01:17:23,270 --> 01:17:20,760

they are just willing to try things and

1257

01:17:25,490 --> 01:17:23,280

see if it works are there capabilities

1258

01:17:27,649 --> 01:17:25,500

that could be employed against us in

1259

01:17:29,330 --> 01:17:27,659

both an ISR and a weapons fashion

1260

01:17:31,550 --> 01:17:29,340

absolutely

1261

01:17:34,390 --> 01:17:31,560

do I have evidence that they're doing it

1262

01:17:39,649 --> 01:17:34,400

in these cases

1263

01:17:44,090 --> 01:17:41,570

thank you I appreciate that and that's

1264

01:17:45,530 --> 01:17:44,100

that is why it's so important that you

1265

01:17:47,390 --> 01:17:45,540

are working with the intelligence

1266

01:17:49,550 --> 01:17:47,400

Community as well

1267

01:17:52,550 --> 01:17:49,560

um because you you have the science the

1268

01:17:56,209 --> 01:17:52,560

data background but you also need to

1269

01:17:58,550 --> 01:17:56,219

know from various sources what

1270

01:18:00,709 --> 01:17:58,560

adversaries may be working on is that

1271

01:18:02,630 --> 01:18:00,719

correct okay thank you thank you very

1272

01:18:04,250 --> 01:18:02,640

much thank you madam chair

1273

01:18:06,410 --> 01:18:04,260

wrote

1274

01:18:08,630 --> 01:18:06,420

uh well thank you chair gillibrand

1275

01:18:10,610 --> 01:18:08,640

ranking member Ernst this is a really

1276

01:18:13,250 --> 01:18:10,620

important hearing I'd like to thank you

1277

01:18:15,770 --> 01:18:13,260

Dr Kirkpatrick for your service to the

1278

01:18:18,709 --> 01:18:15,780

country and as a former systems analyst

1279

01:18:20,870 --> 01:18:18,719

myself I really appreciate uh your flow

1280

01:18:22,910 --> 01:18:20,880

chart the description of the process and

1281

01:18:25,310 --> 01:18:22,920

particularly the trends analysis going

1282

01:18:27,290 --> 01:18:25,320

forward how that's going to help us and

1283

01:18:29,510 --> 01:18:27,300

you've talked about language the large

1284

01:18:31,130 --> 01:18:29,520

llms the large language models of

1285

01:18:32,770 --> 01:18:31,140

artificial intelligence that's really

1286

01:18:35,810 --> 01:18:32,780

going to help us in the hunt forward

1287

01:18:38,149 --> 01:18:35,820

predictive analysis I think

1288

01:18:39,709 --> 01:18:38,159

um to some of your point what we're

1289

01:18:42,169 --> 01:18:39,719

worried about but I want to focus on

1290

01:18:45,590 --> 01:18:42,179

Nevada because uh I want to talk about

1291

01:18:47,810 --> 01:18:45,600

the impact of uaps on Aviation safety so

1292

01:18:50,450 --> 01:18:47,820

when it comes to unified unidentified

1293

01:18:52,370 --> 01:18:50,460

aerial phenomenal phenomena excuse me

1294

01:18:55,430 --> 01:18:52,380

one of my first concerns is really about

1295

01:18:57,470 --> 01:18:55,440

the safety of Nevada's military Aviator

1296

01:18:59,870 --> 01:18:57,480

so we have Airman station at Nellis Air

1297

01:19:02,149 --> 01:18:59,880

Force Base Naval aviators flying at

1298

01:19:04,689 --> 01:19:02,159

Naval Air Station Fallon and service

1299

01:19:07,130 --> 01:19:04,699

members across from across the world

1300

01:19:08,810 --> 01:19:07,140

training at the Nevada test and training

1301  
01:19:10,729 --> 01:19:08,820  
range I know you know all this and

1302  
01:19:13,729 --> 01:19:10,739  
unfortunately the existence of advanced

1303  
01:19:16,610 --> 01:19:13,739  
uaps in the U.S airspace and over U.S

1304  
01:19:17,930 --> 01:19:16,620  
military installations not a new

1305  
01:19:19,970 --> 01:19:17,940  
phenomenon

1306  
01:19:24,229 --> 01:19:19,980  
the Navy's officially acknowledged that

1307  
01:19:26,870 --> 01:19:24,239  
between 2004 and 2021 11 near misses

1308  
01:19:29,870 --> 01:19:26,880  
occurred involving uaps it required

1309  
01:19:32,030 --> 01:19:29,880  
pilot action and follow-up reports as a

1310  
01:19:34,790 --> 01:19:32,040  
result in 2019 the Navy established a

1311  
01:19:37,130 --> 01:19:34,800  
protocol for Pilots to report on their

1312  
01:19:39,890 --> 01:19:37,140  
dangerous encounters so could you speak

1313  
01:19:42,169 --> 01:19:39,900

to any ongoing efforts within DOD to

1314

01:19:45,350 --> 01:19:42,179

ensure the safety of our aviators with a

1315

01:19:47,090 --> 01:19:45,360

potential UAP encounter and what's your

1316

01:19:49,189 --> 01:19:47,100

relationship with North com NORAD

1317

01:19:52,850 --> 01:19:49,199

spacecom when it comes to this immediate

1318

01:19:54,590 --> 01:19:52,860

real-time response and how they're

1319

01:19:57,350 --> 01:19:54,600

they're right there in the moment right

1320

01:19:59,689 --> 01:19:57,360

absolutely that's a great question so

1321

01:20:01,070 --> 01:19:59,699

uh let me start with

1322

01:20:03,590 --> 01:20:01,080

um you know my relationship with the

1323

01:20:05,630 --> 01:20:03,600

commands are are very good I just came

1324

01:20:07,490 --> 01:20:05,640

back from uh sitting down with with

1325

01:20:09,590 --> 01:20:07,500

General van hurk and all the all the J

1326  
01:20:11,810 --> 01:20:09,600  
staff out at North com a couple weeks

1327  
01:20:14,450 --> 01:20:11,820  
ago talking through exactly what we need

1328  
01:20:15,709 --> 01:20:14,460  
to do to help them get their arms around

1329  
01:20:19,250 --> 01:20:15,719  
us

1330  
01:20:21,770 --> 01:20:19,260  
we are also working very closely with

1331  
01:20:24,470 --> 01:20:21,780  
joint staff and the joint staff has just

1332  
01:20:26,810 --> 01:20:24,480  
been very outstanding in helping work

1333  
01:20:30,189 --> 01:20:26,820  
through policy and guidance issues to

1334  
01:20:35,570 --> 01:20:32,630  
and I would like to just make sure that

1335  
01:20:38,930 --> 01:20:35,580  
we we message back to all of the

1336  
01:20:41,750 --> 01:20:38,940  
operators the importance of their uh

1337  
01:20:43,189 --> 01:20:41,760  
reporting and the fact that you're about

1338  
01:20:45,110 --> 01:20:43,199

to get a you know a bunch of new

1339

01:20:47,030 --> 01:20:45,120

requirements that we're issuing through

1340

01:20:49,130 --> 01:20:47,040

the joint staff

1341

01:20:52,430 --> 01:20:49,140

on all of the data that we're going to

1342

01:20:55,910 --> 01:20:52,440

need you to save and report back to us

1343

01:20:58,370 --> 01:20:55,920

it is invaluable and we are working to

1344

01:20:59,930 --> 01:20:58,380

try to to take the most advantage of

1345

01:21:01,189 --> 01:20:59,940

that to learn what it is that we're

1346

01:21:04,070 --> 01:21:01,199

trying to mitigate

1347

01:21:06,010 --> 01:21:04,080

to get directly to your question

1348

01:21:08,209 --> 01:21:06,020

first thing that we're doing is

1349

01:21:10,130 --> 01:21:08,219

normalizing our reporting right we're

1350

01:21:11,890 --> 01:21:10,140

standardizing our reporting and the

1351  
01:21:14,030 --> 01:21:11,900  
requirements associated with that

1352  
01:21:16,370 --> 01:21:14,040  
guidance from the doing staff I think

1353  
01:21:18,229 --> 01:21:16,380  
goes out maybe this week

1354  
01:21:19,729 --> 01:21:18,239  
um maybe next week on that we've been

1355  
01:21:21,770 --> 01:21:19,739  
working with them for some months that

1356  
01:21:23,930 --> 01:21:21,780  
does exactly what I just said gives them

1357  
01:21:25,490 --> 01:21:23,940  
timelines it gives them requirements it

1358  
01:21:27,470 --> 01:21:25,500  
gives them here's all the data you have

1359  
01:21:30,229 --> 01:21:27,480  
to have

1360  
01:21:32,510 --> 01:21:30,239  
um and you got to retain it

1361  
01:21:35,570 --> 01:21:32,520  
the next thing that comes after that is

1362  
01:21:38,810 --> 01:21:35,580  
a plan ORD that will go out to the

1363  
01:21:40,370 --> 01:21:38,820

commands for mitigation and response so

1364

01:21:41,390 --> 01:21:40,380

there's a couple of things that we have

1365

01:21:46,310 --> 01:21:41,400

to do

1366

01:21:50,090 --> 01:21:46,320

one I need to work with the commands and

1367

01:21:52,610 --> 01:21:50,100

with the IC and with our outside of our

1368

01:21:54,189 --> 01:21:52,620

DOD and IC Partners to extend our

1369

01:21:57,169 --> 01:21:54,199

collection posture

1370

01:21:59,330 --> 01:21:57,179

targeted at some of these key areas that

1371

01:22:02,270 --> 01:21:59,340

you saw on that heat map

1372

01:22:05,630 --> 01:22:02,280

that have a lot of activity so that we

1373

01:22:08,209 --> 01:22:05,640

can turn on extra collection when an

1374

01:22:09,970 --> 01:22:08,219

operator sees something so part of this

1375

01:22:13,310 --> 01:22:09,980

is generating

1376  
01:22:16,010 --> 01:22:13,320  
as a response function what we call a

1377  
01:22:18,110 --> 01:22:16,020  
tactic technique and procedure for an

1378  
01:22:20,209 --> 01:22:18,120  
operator when he sees something calls

1379  
01:22:22,610 --> 01:22:20,219  
back to the operations floor they can

1380  
01:22:24,830 --> 01:22:22,620  
turn on additional collection what does

1381  
01:22:26,689 --> 01:22:24,840  
that collection look like how do I bring

1382  
01:22:29,450 --> 01:22:26,699  
all that together so I can get more data

1383  
01:22:31,669 --> 01:22:29,460  
on what is that thing can I ask really

1384  
01:22:33,649 --> 01:22:31,679  
quickly do you have the authorities you

1385  
01:22:37,189 --> 01:22:33,659  
need to extend your collection posture

1386  
01:22:38,990 --> 01:22:37,199  
between agencies or or branches of the

1387  
01:22:41,510 --> 01:22:39,000  
military because that seems to me to

1388  
01:22:43,130 --> 01:22:41,520

maybe be a sticking point I know my

1389

01:22:44,350 --> 01:22:43,140

time's just about up I'd love to follow

1390

01:22:47,030 --> 01:22:44,360

up about your risk management

1391

01:22:48,950 --> 01:22:47,040

methodologies for some of these but do

1392

01:22:51,470 --> 01:22:48,960

you need any authorities that you don't

1393

01:22:52,910 --> 01:22:51,480

have to uh get get the data there are

1394

01:22:54,770 --> 01:22:52,920

some authorities that we need we

1395

01:22:56,870 --> 01:22:54,780

currently are operating under title 10

1396

01:22:58,910 --> 01:22:56,880

authorities but we have

1397

01:23:01,310 --> 01:22:58,920

um you know good relationships across

1398

01:23:03,370 --> 01:23:01,320

the other agencies but having additional

1399

01:23:04,850 --> 01:23:03,380

authorities for collection tasking

1400

01:23:06,590 --> 01:23:04,860

counterintelligence that's something

1401  
01:23:07,910 --> 01:23:06,600  
those are all things that would be

1402  
01:23:09,890 --> 01:23:07,920  
helpful yes

1403  
01:23:11,810 --> 01:23:09,900  
thank you to follow up Dr Kirkpatrick

1404  
01:23:13,189 --> 01:23:11,820  
will you help us write that language so

1405  
01:23:14,630 --> 01:23:13,199  
we can put it in the defense bill this

1406  
01:23:18,050 --> 01:23:14,640  
year so that we know what authorities

1407  
01:23:19,550 --> 01:23:18,060  
you need we can do that thank you

1408  
01:23:20,750 --> 01:23:19,560  
um we're going to start second round so

1409  
01:23:22,550 --> 01:23:20,760  
if you want to stay you can ask another

1410  
01:23:24,290 --> 01:23:22,560  
round I have at least three more

1411  
01:23:26,149 --> 01:23:24,300  
questions so

1412  
01:23:28,850 --> 01:23:26,159  
do you want to do you want to go right

1413  
01:23:41,450 --> 01:23:28,860

now so in case you have to leave

1414

01:23:44,990 --> 01:23:42,310

um

1415

01:23:47,510 --> 01:23:45,000

spy balloon it did cross through the U.S

1416

01:23:50,209 --> 01:23:47,520

airspace shot down by a Sidewinder

1417

01:23:53,030 --> 01:23:50,219

missile fired from an F-22

1418

01:23:55,189 --> 01:23:53,040

Sidewinders cost us close to half a

1419

01:23:57,530 --> 01:23:55,199

million dollars each

1420

01:23:59,450 --> 01:23:57,540

so given the cost of these missiles the

1421

01:24:01,189 --> 01:23:59,460

cost per flight all of these other

1422

01:24:03,229 --> 01:24:01,199

things like I said follow up on the

1423

01:24:04,669 --> 01:24:03,239

authorities your methodologies the data

1424

01:24:07,250 --> 01:24:04,679

collection they can help us in other

1425

01:24:10,010 --> 01:24:07,260

ways but how do you think we can develop

1426

01:24:12,770 --> 01:24:10,020

a sustainable affordable response to

1427

01:24:15,169 --> 01:24:12,780

uaps where we need to

1428

01:24:17,930 --> 01:24:15,179

um that may that will definitely violate

1429

01:24:20,270 --> 01:24:17,940

our airspace not may definitely violate

1430

01:24:21,890 --> 01:24:20,280

our airspace every chance that they can

1431

01:24:23,810 --> 01:24:21,900

get because there are adversaries they

1432

01:24:26,030 --> 01:24:23,820

want this information so what do you

1433

01:24:29,450 --> 01:24:26,040

think some cost-effective measures might

1434

01:24:30,890 --> 01:24:29,460

be that we can get what we need out of

1435

01:24:32,330 --> 01:24:30,900

that or take them down whatever is

1436

01:24:34,130 --> 01:24:32,340

appropriate whatever the appropriate

1437

01:24:36,050 --> 01:24:34,140

measure is let's put it down so that

1438

01:24:37,729 --> 01:24:36,060

that is actually wrapped into the plan

1439

01:24:40,250 --> 01:24:37,739

ORD that we're working with joint staff

1440

01:24:42,649 --> 01:24:40,260

to send out what are the commands need

1441

01:24:45,830 --> 01:24:42,659

from both a capabilities perspective for

1442

01:24:49,010 --> 01:24:45,840

kinetic and non-kinetic engagements what

1443

01:24:53,330 --> 01:24:49,020

are the response functions of the of the

1444

01:24:55,310 --> 01:24:53,340

particular wings or or navy what have

1445

01:24:58,189 --> 01:24:55,320

you and then

1446

01:24:59,750 --> 01:24:58,199

what authorities do they need so one of

1447

01:25:01,850 --> 01:24:59,760

the one of the challenges that we've

1448

01:25:04,669 --> 01:25:01,860

seen is is you know there's an

1449

01:25:07,729 --> 01:25:04,679

authorities issues with the with the

1450

01:25:09,050 --> 01:25:07,739

owners operators of those ranges that

1451  
01:25:13,570 --> 01:25:09,060  
they need to work through and we're

1452  
01:25:16,790 --> 01:25:13,580  
working that with joint staff and OSD so

1453  
01:25:18,410 --> 01:25:16,800  
big picture we need to do all that if

1454  
01:25:20,030 --> 01:25:18,420  
you want to get down to the specifics

1455  
01:25:21,890 --> 01:25:20,040  
for you know there are non-kinetic

1456  
01:25:24,729 --> 01:25:21,900  
options to engage pretty much everything

1457  
01:25:27,290 --> 01:25:24,739  
right whether it's electronic warfare

1458  
01:25:29,750 --> 01:25:27,300  
whether it's you know Laser Technology

1459  
01:25:32,510 --> 01:25:29,760  
that's where this data having a good

1460  
01:25:35,450 --> 01:25:32,520  
data collection Predictive Analytics you

1461  
01:25:37,310 --> 01:25:35,460  
can inform make some assumptions and

1462  
01:25:39,830 --> 01:25:37,320  
possibilities that's right and we will

1463  
01:25:41,990 --> 01:25:39,840

inform uh recommendations back to the

1464

01:25:43,970 --> 01:25:42,000

department on here's what could work

1465

01:25:46,310 --> 01:25:43,980

here's what we've seen work here's what

1466

01:25:48,410 --> 01:25:46,320

doesn't work thank you so much thank you

1467

01:25:49,250 --> 01:25:48,420

madam chair I appreciate it thank you

1468

01:25:51,410 --> 01:25:49,260

very much

1469

01:25:53,090 --> 01:25:51,420

um I just wanted to just talk a little

1470

01:25:56,030 --> 01:25:53,100

bit about your Logistics who you report

1471

01:25:58,010 --> 01:25:56,040

to how that's going uh whether you need

1472

01:25:59,510 --> 01:25:58,020

different reporting lines

1473

01:26:01,610 --> 01:25:59,520

um by Congressional legislation your

1474

01:26:03,169 --> 01:26:01,620

office is administratively located with

1475

01:26:05,090 --> 01:26:03,179

the office of the undersecretary of

1476  
01:26:06,950 --> 01:26:05,100  
defense for intelligence security but

1477  
01:26:08,870 --> 01:26:06,960  
you're not substantively subordinate to

1478  
01:26:10,490 --> 01:26:08,880  
the under secretary rather you are a

1479  
01:26:12,169 --> 01:26:10,500  
direct report to the deputy secretary

1480  
01:26:13,970 --> 01:26:12,179  
are you taking Direction directly from

1481  
01:26:16,669 --> 01:26:13,980  
the deputy secretary are you able to

1482  
01:26:19,910 --> 01:26:16,679  
meet and brief the deputy secretary

1483  
01:26:22,010 --> 01:26:19,920  
um is the office of USD ins

1484  
01:26:23,750 --> 01:26:22,020  
um working with you to have the right

1485  
01:26:28,970 --> 01:26:23,760  
framework

1486  
01:26:32,450 --> 01:26:28,980  
so USD ins and the uh I I currently

1487  
01:26:35,750 --> 01:26:32,460  
report to USD ins

1488  
01:26:36,590 --> 01:26:35,760

until they come up with the the plan for

1489

01:26:39,470 --> 01:26:36,600

how they're going to implement

1490

01:26:46,310 --> 01:26:43,070

DOD and dni are working through that now

1491

01:26:49,129 --> 01:26:46,320

I'd have to refer you back to USD ins on

1492

01:26:52,390 --> 01:26:49,139

what their plan is

1493

01:26:56,870 --> 01:26:55,129

do I need to update your reporting

1494

01:26:58,129 --> 01:26:56,880

structure in the next defense bill or is

1495

01:26:59,810 --> 01:26:58,139

this something that you think will work

1496

01:27:01,430 --> 01:26:59,820

its way out or does it need further

1497

01:27:03,350 --> 01:27:01,440

Clarity I think they're planning on

1498

01:27:06,290 --> 01:27:03,360

coming back to you with an answer on

1499

01:27:08,030 --> 01:27:06,300

what that plan is and I think at that

1500

01:27:11,510 --> 01:27:08,040

time that will inform

1501

01:27:14,510 --> 01:27:11,520

what you want to do okay thank you

1502

01:27:15,770 --> 01:27:14,520

um as you know Dr Kirkpatrick Congress

1503

01:27:17,450 --> 01:27:15,780

has mandated that your office

1504

01:27:19,729 --> 01:27:17,460

established a discoverable and

1505

01:27:22,129 --> 01:27:19,739

accessible electronic method for

1506

01:27:24,950 --> 01:27:22,139

potential Witnesses of UAP incidents and

1507

01:27:26,750 --> 01:27:24,960

potential participants in government UAP

1508

01:27:28,550 --> 01:27:26,760

related activities to contact your

1509

01:27:30,649 --> 01:27:28,560

office and tell their stories

1510

01:27:31,490 --> 01:27:30,659

Congress also set up a process whereby

1511

01:27:33,950 --> 01:27:31,500

people

1512

01:27:35,510 --> 01:27:33,960

subject to non-disclosure agreements

1513

01:27:36,770 --> 01:27:35,520

preventing them from disclosing what

1514

01:27:39,169 --> 01:27:36,780

they may have witnessed or participated

1515

01:27:40,729 --> 01:27:39,179

in could tell you what they know that

1516

01:27:43,370 --> 01:27:40,739

risk of Retribution from the or

1517

01:27:44,870 --> 01:27:43,380

violation of their ndas have you

1518

01:27:46,490 --> 01:27:44,880

submitted a public-facing website

1519

01:27:49,010 --> 01:27:46,500

product for approval to your superiors

1520

01:27:52,790 --> 01:27:49,020

and how long has it been under review

1521

01:27:56,750 --> 01:27:52,800

I have we submitted the first version of

1522

01:28:00,770 --> 01:27:58,970

and do you have an estimate from them

1523

01:28:04,850 --> 01:28:00,780

when they will respond and when you'll

1524

01:28:06,530 --> 01:28:04,860

have feedback on that no I don't okay we

1525

01:28:08,570 --> 01:28:06,540

will Author a letter asking for that

1526  
01:28:12,709 --> 01:28:08,580  
timely response

1527  
01:28:14,330 --> 01:28:12,719  
um to your superiors oh when when do you

1528  
01:28:16,490 --> 01:28:14,340  
expect that you will establish a

1529  
01:28:19,490 --> 01:28:16,500  
public-facing discoverable

1530  
01:28:22,970 --> 01:28:19,500  
um an access portal for people to use to

1531  
01:28:26,330 --> 01:28:22,980  
contact your office as the law requires

1532  
01:28:29,270 --> 01:28:26,340  
so I would like to First say thank you

1533  
01:28:31,729 --> 01:28:29,280  
all very much for referring the

1534  
01:28:34,189 --> 01:28:31,739  
witnesses that you have thus far to us I

1535  
01:28:36,649 --> 01:28:34,199  
appreciate that we've brought in nearly

1536  
01:28:38,750 --> 01:28:36,659  
two dozen so far it's been it's been

1537  
01:28:40,669 --> 01:28:38,760  
very uh helpful I'd ask that you

1538  
01:28:42,070 --> 01:28:40,679

continue to do that until we have an

1539

01:28:45,290 --> 01:28:42,080

approved plan

1540

01:28:48,470 --> 01:28:45,300

we have a multi-phased approach for

1541

01:28:52,669 --> 01:28:48,480

doing that that we've been uh

1542

01:28:54,250 --> 01:28:52,679

socializing have submitted for approval

1543

01:28:56,810 --> 01:28:54,260

sometime

1544

01:28:59,270 --> 01:28:56,820

and once that happens then we should be

1545

01:29:01,610 --> 01:28:59,280

able to push all that out and get uh get

1546

01:29:03,470 --> 01:29:01,620

this a little more automated great

1547

01:29:06,410 --> 01:29:03,480

um what I would ask though is as you all

1548

01:29:08,689 --> 01:29:06,420

continue to refer to us and refer

1549

01:29:12,169 --> 01:29:08,699

witnesses to us I'd appreciate if you do

1550

01:29:14,030 --> 01:29:12,179

that please try to prioritize the ones

1551

01:29:17,990 --> 01:29:14,040

that you want to do because we do have a

1552

01:29:19,729 --> 01:29:18,000

small research staff dealing with that

1553

01:29:21,709 --> 01:29:19,739

thank you

1554

01:29:23,330 --> 01:29:21,719

um and then do you have any uh plans for

1555

01:29:25,490 --> 01:29:23,340

public engagement that you want to share

1556

01:29:28,189 --> 01:29:25,500

now that you think it's important that

1557

01:29:30,890 --> 01:29:28,199

the public knows what the plan is

1558

01:29:33,669 --> 01:29:30,900

so we have a uh

1559

01:29:36,169 --> 01:29:33,679

a number of public engagement

1560

01:29:37,450 --> 01:29:36,179

recommendations uh according to our

1561

01:29:40,250 --> 01:29:37,460

strategic plan

1562

01:29:42,890 --> 01:29:40,260

all of those have been submitted for

1563

01:29:46,669 --> 01:29:42,900

approval they have to be approved by USD

1564

01:29:49,310 --> 01:29:46,679

ins we are waiting for approval to go do

1565

01:29:52,010 --> 01:29:49,320

that okay I will follow up on that

1566

01:29:53,570 --> 01:29:52,020

um and then my last question is about

1567

01:29:55,610 --> 01:29:53,580

um

1568

01:29:57,410 --> 01:29:55,620

the integration of departments UAP

1569

01:29:59,770 --> 01:29:57,420

operations research analysis and

1570

01:30:02,750 --> 01:29:59,780

strategic Communications

1571

01:30:04,669 --> 01:30:02,760

during the recent UAP incidents over

1572

01:30:07,370 --> 01:30:04,679

North America it didn't appear that you

1573

01:30:08,750 --> 01:30:07,380

were allowed to play that role do you

1574

01:30:10,370 --> 01:30:08,760

agree that the public perception is

1575

01:30:11,810 --> 01:30:10,380

generally that you and your office did

1576

01:30:13,129 --> 01:30:11,820

not appear to play a major role in the

1577

01:30:15,189 --> 01:30:13,139

Department's response to the detection

1578

01:30:17,750 --> 01:30:15,199

of objects over North America

1579

01:30:19,310 --> 01:30:17,760

what can you tell us that's going on

1580

01:30:21,709 --> 01:30:19,320

behind the scenes from your perspective

1581

01:30:24,169 --> 01:30:21,719

and in the after action assessment

1582

01:30:25,610 --> 01:30:24,179

process is there awareness that there is

1583

01:30:27,890 --> 01:30:25,620

a need to operate differently in the

1584

01:30:29,890 --> 01:30:27,900

future and a commitment to doing so

1585

01:30:32,990 --> 01:30:29,900

foreign

1586

01:30:36,770 --> 01:30:33,000

objects were first detected I got called

1587

01:30:40,669 --> 01:30:36,780

by joint staff leadership uh to come in

1588

01:30:42,830 --> 01:30:40,679

uh late one night to review events as

1589

01:30:46,129 --> 01:30:42,840

they were unfo unfolding and to give

1590

01:30:48,070 --> 01:30:46,139

them a you know an assessment based on

1591

01:30:51,530 --> 01:30:48,080

what we knew at that time

1592

01:30:55,250 --> 01:30:51,540

I did that I worked with the director of

1593

01:30:57,890 --> 01:30:55,260

joint staff the J2 and the j3 that night

1594

01:31:00,350 --> 01:30:57,900

and over the couple of following days on

1595

01:31:02,570 --> 01:31:00,360

what are the types of things that we are

1596

01:31:05,270 --> 01:31:02,580

tracking from a unidentified object

1597

01:31:07,790 --> 01:31:05,280

perspective what databases do we use

1598

01:31:10,970 --> 01:31:07,800

those sorts of things for for Norm for

1599

01:31:12,490 --> 01:31:10,980

known objects known tracking

1600

01:31:15,709 --> 01:31:12,500

um

1601

01:31:17,510 --> 01:31:15,719

beyond that the response I would have to

1602

01:31:19,910 --> 01:31:17,520

I would have to refer you back to the

1603

01:31:23,810 --> 01:31:19,920

White House for the decision on how they

1604

01:31:26,629 --> 01:31:23,820

did the response we did not play a role

1605

01:31:28,010 --> 01:31:26,639

in what you would respond other than

1606

01:31:28,669 --> 01:31:28,020

that initial

1607

01:31:30,649 --> 01:31:28,679

um

1608

01:31:35,750 --> 01:31:30,659

you know advice on what we are seeing

1609

01:31:42,470 --> 01:31:38,990

thank you Matt thank you madam chair

1610

01:31:45,169 --> 01:31:42,480

um Dr Kirkpatrick I I know that your

1611

01:31:48,470 --> 01:31:45,179

office has gotten a lot of attention uh

1612

01:31:50,990 --> 01:31:48,480

recently and of course any new agency

1613

01:31:53,930 --> 01:31:51,000

there tends to be a push to increase

1614

01:31:55,729 --> 01:31:53,940

size and and funding

1615

01:31:58,550 --> 01:31:55,739

um we want to make sure that you're able

1616

01:32:00,770 --> 01:31:58,560

to meet your goals but what I also need

1617

01:32:04,669 --> 01:32:00,780

to ensure is that we're not duplicating

1618

01:32:08,629 --> 01:32:04,679

or replicating existing functions and

1619

01:32:11,689 --> 01:32:08,639

creating redundancy within DOD and the

1620

01:32:14,689 --> 01:32:11,699

interagency so what steps are you taking

1621

01:32:18,830 --> 01:32:14,699

right now to make sure that your

1622

01:32:22,669 --> 01:32:18,840

particular office and function is is

1623

01:32:25,129 --> 01:32:22,679

unique uh to any of the other agencies

1624

01:32:27,050 --> 01:32:25,139

that might be involved in these types of

1625

01:32:30,590 --> 01:32:27,060

cases yeah that's a that's a great

1626

01:32:32,750 --> 01:32:30,600

question so I would like to lay down

1627

01:32:34,910 --> 01:32:32,760

here's here's what am I

1628

01:32:38,629 --> 01:32:34,920

so my mission and my goal and my vision

1629

01:32:40,189 --> 01:32:38,639

here so the vision is at one point at

1630

01:32:43,010 --> 01:32:40,199

some point in the future

1631

01:32:45,169 --> 01:32:43,020

you should not need an arrow if I'm

1632

01:32:47,390 --> 01:32:45,179

successful in what I'm doing we should

1633

01:32:49,790 --> 01:32:47,400

be able to normalize everything that

1634

01:32:52,790 --> 01:32:49,800

we're doing into existing processes

1635

01:32:54,470 --> 01:32:52,800

functions agencies and organizations and

1636

01:32:57,050 --> 01:32:54,480

make that part of their mission and

1637

01:33:00,890 --> 01:32:57,060

their role right now the niche that we

1638

01:33:03,530 --> 01:33:00,900

form is really going after the unknowns

1639

01:33:07,189 --> 01:33:03,540

if you I think you articulated it early

1640

01:33:09,229 --> 01:33:07,199

on this is a Hunt mission for what might

1641

01:33:10,970 --> 01:33:09,239

somebody be doing in our backyard that

1642

01:33:13,370 --> 01:33:10,980

we don't know about

1643

01:33:15,830 --> 01:33:13,380

all right well that that that is what we

1644

01:33:17,629 --> 01:33:15,840

are doing right but at some point we

1645

01:33:19,490 --> 01:33:17,639

should be able to normalize that that's

1646

01:33:21,649 --> 01:33:19,500

why it's so important the work we're

1647

01:33:25,490 --> 01:33:21,659

doing with joint staff to normalize that

1648

01:33:27,890 --> 01:33:25,500

into uh Paula DOD policy and guidance

1649

01:33:30,169 --> 01:33:27,900

we are bringing in all of our

1650

01:33:33,350 --> 01:33:30,179

interagency partners so NASA is









1701  
01:35:38,570 --> 01:35:36,900  
cross-correlating it to what pilots are

1702  
01:35:43,070 --> 01:35:38,580  
saying they're seeing or other

1703  
01:35:45,830 --> 01:35:43,080  
observations from other operators

1704  
01:35:48,590 --> 01:35:45,840  
what that allows us to do is then see if

1705  
01:35:52,430 --> 01:35:48,600  
there are any any signatures in that

1706  
01:35:54,169 --> 01:35:52,440  
data that I can pull out generate uh

1707  
01:35:56,990 --> 01:35:54,179  
what we'll call automatic Target

1708  
01:35:59,689 --> 01:35:57,000  
recognition algorithms that allow us to

1709  
01:36:05,390 --> 01:35:59,699  
then use that signature associated with

1710  
01:36:07,610 --> 01:36:05,400  
a observed UAP whatever that UAP may be

1711  
01:36:10,729 --> 01:36:07,620  
we will then make those recommendations

1712  
01:36:12,709 --> 01:36:10,739  
of what those changes should be back to

1713  
01:36:16,490 --> 01:36:12,719



1726  
01:36:51,950 --> 01:36:49,800  
can't have people in the loop all the

1727  
01:36:53,390 --> 01:36:51,960  
time you can you know it's just not cost

1728  
01:36:56,330 --> 01:36:53,400  
effective

1729  
01:36:58,790 --> 01:36:56,340  
so part of our budget is working through

1730  
01:37:00,590 --> 01:36:58,800  
what is what does that look like

1731  
01:37:03,169 --> 01:37:00,600  
and then making those recommendations

1732  
01:37:08,090 --> 01:37:03,179  
back to the big program offices for them

1733  
01:37:11,450 --> 01:37:10,129  
my last question is about the academic

1734  
01:37:13,310 --> 01:37:11,460  
Community

1735  
01:37:14,810 --> 01:37:13,320  
um can you give us an update on sort of

1736  
01:37:17,990 --> 01:37:14,820  
how you collaborate with the academic

1737  
01:37:19,910 --> 01:37:18,000  
community and whether how the

1738  
01:37:23,510 --> 01:37:19,920

independent study being done by NASA

1739

01:37:25,370 --> 01:37:23,520  
complements arrows work sure

1740

01:37:27,550 --> 01:37:25,380  
two questions so I'm going to try to

1741

01:37:29,330 --> 01:37:27,560  
make it quick the uh

1742

01:37:32,930 --> 01:37:29,340  
1979

1743

01:37:35,810 --> 01:37:32,940  
Carl Sagan said extraordinary claims

1744

01:37:37,669 --> 01:37:35,820  
require extraordinary evidence

1745

01:37:40,729 --> 01:37:37,679  
I would go one step further and I would

1746

01:37:41,990 --> 01:37:40,739  
say extraordinary claims require not

1747

01:37:44,090 --> 01:37:42,000  
only extraordinary evidence but

1748

01:37:46,070 --> 01:37:44,100  
extraordinary science and so how do you

1749

01:37:48,770 --> 01:37:46,080  
do that you do that with the scientific

1750

01:37:51,350 --> 01:37:48,780  
method right and so as arrow is

1751  
01:37:55,490 --> 01:37:51,360  
developing and implementing its science

1752  
01:37:58,129 --> 01:37:55,500  
plan it has to do so grounded in a solid

1753  
01:38:01,250 --> 01:37:58,139  
foundation of scientific theory across

1754  
01:38:04,610 --> 01:38:01,260  
the entire range of hypotheses

1755  
01:38:06,830 --> 01:38:04,620  
that have been presented for what UAP

1756  
01:38:10,850 --> 01:38:06,840  
are

1757  
01:38:14,629 --> 01:38:10,860  
that range spans adversary breakthrough

1758  
01:38:17,149 --> 01:38:14,639  
technology on one hand known objects and

1759  
01:38:18,590 --> 01:38:17,159  
phenomena in the middle all the way to

1760  
01:38:20,450 --> 01:38:18,600  
the extreme theories of

1761  
01:38:24,950 --> 01:38:20,460  
extraterrestrials

1762  
01:38:26,750 --> 01:38:24,960  
all of that has physics-based signatures

1763  
01:38:29,750 --> 01:38:26,760



1776  
01:39:02,810 --> 01:39:00,480  
the intelligence community on the other

1777  
01:39:03,830 --> 01:39:02,820  
end of the spectrum and then measurement

1778  
01:39:07,129 --> 01:39:03,840  
in the middle

1779  
01:39:11,350 --> 01:39:07,139  
once I have those signatures identified

1780  
01:39:13,669 --> 01:39:11,360  
in invalidated peer-reviewed

1781  
01:39:15,950 --> 01:39:13,679  
documents then I have something to point

1782  
01:39:17,510 --> 01:39:15,960  
to for all that data

1783  
01:39:19,370 --> 01:39:17,520  
because all that data is going to match

1784  
01:39:21,709 --> 01:39:19,380  
one of those signatures

1785  
01:39:24,709 --> 01:39:21,719  
right and then I can go well it's that

1786  
01:39:27,770 --> 01:39:24,719  
and not that or it's that

1787  
01:39:31,189 --> 01:39:27,780  
and that helps us go through all that

1788  
01:39:34,490 --> 01:39:31,199



1801  
01:40:10,669 --> 01:40:07,679  
lots of them how many of those

1802  
01:40:14,090 --> 01:40:10,679  
is the data valuable

1803  
01:40:17,450 --> 01:40:14,100  
in seeing these kinds of objects

1804  
01:40:20,270 --> 01:40:17,460  
the challenge in that is those those

1805  
01:40:22,189 --> 01:40:20,280  
platforms don't necessarily have the

1806  
01:40:24,830 --> 01:40:22,199  
resolution you need so if you remember

1807  
01:40:26,930 --> 01:40:24,840  
the slide I put up there with the trends

1808  
01:40:29,930 --> 01:40:26,940  
the size of the objects we're looking

1809  
01:40:31,550 --> 01:40:29,940  
for are typically reported to be one to

1810  
01:40:33,770 --> 01:40:31,560  
four meters

1811  
01:40:36,649 --> 01:40:33,780  
well the resolution of many of the

1812  
01:40:39,169 --> 01:40:36,659  
climate science civil um science you

1813  
01:40:41,270 --> 01:40:39,179



1826  
01:41:14,709 --> 01:41:09,540  
talked about in the past

1827  
01:41:17,149 --> 01:41:14,719  
to look at is there a way to smartly

1828  
01:41:18,770 --> 01:41:17,159  
crowdsource additional data that might

1829  
01:41:22,790 --> 01:41:18,780  
be useful

1830  
01:41:25,010 --> 01:41:22,800  
to augment some of my classified sources

1831  
01:41:26,570 --> 01:41:25,020  
and what does that look like and how

1832  
01:41:29,090 --> 01:41:26,580  
would we do it so that we're not

1833  
01:41:36,229 --> 01:41:29,100  
overwhelmed by you know everybody who

1834  
01:41:38,870 --> 01:41:38,030  
like to tell the committee before we

1835  
01:41:40,550 --> 01:41:38,880  
close

1836  
01:41:41,390 --> 01:41:40,560  
or do you have another round yeah do you

1837  
01:41:43,370 --> 01:41:41,400  
have anything else you'd like to tell

1838  
01:41:45,530 --> 01:41:43,380



1851  
01:47:14,719 --> 01:47:19,090  
thank you

1852  
01:47:24,470 --> 01:47:21,770  
the somewhere in the skies podcast is

1853  
01:47:26,570 --> 01:47:24,480  
free to listen to every week but if you

1854  
01:47:29,450 --> 01:47:26,580  
would like to help support the show we

1855  
01:47:31,010 --> 01:47:29,460  
have a very active patreon page where

1856  
01:47:33,649 --> 01:47:31,020  
you give what you think the show is

1857  
01:47:36,830 --> 01:47:33,659  
worth in return you'll get early access

1858  
01:47:40,010 --> 01:47:36,840  
to the main show bonus episodes and

1859  
01:47:42,770 --> 01:47:40,020  
priority to ask our guests your listener

1860  
01:47:45,950 --> 01:47:42,780  
questions your support truly makes the

1861  
01:47:49,209 --> 01:47:45,960  
show continue and grow so to learn more

1862  
01:47:50,850 --> 01:47:49,219  
and to join visit [patreon.com](https://www.patreon.com)

1863  
01:48:10,560 --> 01:47:50,860

somewhere Skies

1864

01:48:44,330 --> 01:48:11,770

[Music]

1865

01:48:44,340 --> 01:48:49,940

foreign

1866

01:49:25,010 --> 01:48:58,280

[Music]

1867

01:49:46,620 --> 01:49:25,020

foreign

1868

01:49:49,950 --> 01:49:48,750

[Music]

1869

01:49:56,870 --> 01:49:49,960

[Applause]

1870

01:49:58,120 --> 01:49:56,880

[Music]

1871

01:50:00,990 --> 01:49:58,130

foreign

1872

01:50:01,450 --> 01:50:01,000

[Music]

1873

01:50:09,370 --> 01:50:01,460

[Applause]

1874

01:50:11,320 --> 01:50:09,380

[Music]

1875

01:50:14,920 --> 01:50:11,330

[Applause]

1876

01:50:18,310 --> 01:50:14,930

[Music]

1877

01:50:18,310 --> 01:50:18,320

[Applause]

1878

01:50:18,320 --> 01:50:26,330

[Music]